The Echo of Battle is a must read for all professional Army officers to better contemplate the overarching doctrinal development of the United States Army. The book is in itself a history of the Army, the development of the Army’s tactical doctrine and how the doctrine of the Army has changed over time. The main argument of the book is that the central concepts of the Army were not formed in war but in the long periods of peace in between actual combat. Brian Linn, the author, further argues that the military intellectual elite have over the years created the ‘American Way of War’ instead of the great leaders of the military such as Patton or Eisenhower.
To speak of an ‘American Way of War’ means that America actually has a defined understanding
…show more content…
Linn puts forward the argument that for the majority of the US Army’s history the American national strategic strategy has been shaped by three intellectual theories of war. While these three schools of thought have evolved over time, the basic concepts and assumptions have remained unchanged over time. As he states these three schools of thought are “Like a braid, each strand will, for a time, be visible on the surface and at other times will disappear, only to emerge farther down on the braid. At times the strand are so closely knit as to be indistinguishable; at other times they practically pull apart” ( Linn, …show more content…
This statement epitomizes the second martial theory; the Heroes. The Heroes view war in the simplest of terms as armed conflict with the objective to conquering the enemy in which the human elements, military genius, courage, military experience, morale and discipline is paramount. From a Heroes perspective war is an armed conflict towards the achievement of a goal. The heroic sub-culture is best known for be able to adapt to separate the key information from the mundane, to be flexible and adaptable to the changing nature of warfare. Brian Linn gives the example of a hero as General George S. Patton who went from being a supporter of mechanized warfare, a cavalryman, and then finally becoming one of the greatest practitioners of maneuver warfare. Unlike the Guardians war is not defined by rules or formulas, but by experience and an almost guttural response to combat. Heroes criticize those “who seek to impose predictability and order on a phenomenon they view as chaotic, violent, and emotional” (Linn, 6). At its finest, the Heroic sub-culture provides both an “intellectual and practical framework” (Linn 6-7) that leads to victory on the battlefield. It also can lead to posturing and elitism especially among leadership, and can lead to an “anti-intellectual” (Linn, 7) environment that sees war as an end rather than the means to achieve a political goal. While Heroes believe that victory is achieved
On July 30, 2008, a bloody battle involving Coalition forces took place in the mountainous eastern Afghan province of Nuristan. This was the Battle of Wanat and the devastating amount of Coalition casualties began a vigorous investigation by the United States Army. The village of Wanat, defended by Second Platoon, Chosen Company, Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team would fall victim to numerous bad decision made by higher command. Although the men of Chosen Company fought hard, they ended up surrounded, vastly outnumbered, and without any Battalion assets. This paper will argue the reasons for the disastrous outcome of the Battle of Wanat; examining the effective company leadership exploiting effective
They need to know their strengths and their enemy's weakness. If they do this they should not need to worry about the victory and focus on the task at hand. They will know when and when not to fight by following this message. This writing helped many military leaders guide their army into war. Legalism also helped people in war ,along with governing.
The Warriors Ethos is a book written by Steven Pressfield, which was published in 2011. The book highlights a very rich history of warriors and their supporters alike. My goal with this paper is to draw some parallels between the examples in the book and what I took away as applicable to our lives as infantrymen In the United States Marine Corps. Chapter one is named “ Tough Mothers “. The chapter that stuck out to me most for giving perspective that I lacked prior to reading this book.
Abrams also stressed a “one war” concept that put equal emphasis on military operations, improvement of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and pacification – all of which are codependent so that the better we do in one, the more our chance of progress in others (18). The changes in tactics under Abrams, and in the concept of the nature of the war, and even the enemy reaction to battlefield reserves, by no means meant an end to fierce combat, or even to large-scale military operations (138). America’s principal national objective became peace. Abrams policy proved to be better than the policy of attrition. The policy of attrition simply meant, under those circumstances, a very prolonged type of warfare, whereas the U.S. can clear and hold, and keep an area secure, and keep the enemy out.
This farthest reaching placement of responsibility on U.S. military strategy elaborates on Caputo’s description of disillusionment from the number of people dying for no evident progress and provides one focus for his observation of what might be preventable about warfare. In describing his resistance to listen to more experienced officers, Caputo recognizes that communicating the risks and trauma of warfare requires precise description and a willingness to listen; “They had already been where we were going, to that frontier between life and death, but none of us wanted to listen to them. So I guess every generation is doomed to fight its war, to endure the same old experiences, suffer the loss of the same old illusions, and learn the same old lessons on its own.” The structure of the vicarious tour of duty is an attempt to communicate the same old experiences, illusions, and lessons as they appeared for servicemen in the American War, but by Caputo’s own acknowledgement this attempt is destined to fail because its lesson cannot be fully understood without direct
It is vital that the military uses history to their advantage, whether it is good or bad, in
Book Review 2: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises by Richard Betts Summary: Betts starts off his book by recognizing the ambiguity around the advocacy of the use of force in a crisis by military leaders even though there is a prevalent assumption that military professionals are more aggressive than diplomats and politicians. He states he writes the book in order to provide a comprehensive survey of the postwar role of American military men in decisions on their most essential function, their use of force in combat. Betts acknowledges the vast availability of literature on military participation in decisions on defense budgets and weapons procurement, but feels there is a void when looking at decision-making from the perspective of military leadership versus civilian leadership.
Can an antiquated lens provide an adequate examination and understanding of modern warfare? The theories of Carl von Clausewitz retain remarkable contemporary merit and relevance in explaining the critical elements affecting warfare in the modern era. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories of war endeavor to be comprehendible, comprehensive, and strategic. Clausewitz contends that the conduct of war itself is without doubt very difficult. But the difficulty is not that erudition and great genius are necessary to understand the basic principles of warfare.1 Clausewitz 's 1812 essay, the Principles of War, offers military commanders, with little campaign experience, a comprehendible, comprehensive, and strategic model for attaining victory in battle.
In the essay “A New Moral Compact,” David W. Barno formally uses effective rhetorical techniques to successfully argue that a draft lottery system is essential for the United States’ involvement in armed foreign conflict to subside. The first way Barno creates an effective argument is by his technique of consistently using the literary device of comparison to identify the similar, yet different, nature of the participation in the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts to the Vietnam War. Within the first sentence of the essay, Barno informs the reader of the United States entering “its second decade of armed conflict,” which translates into eleven years of continuous strife that the nation has endured throughout Afghanistan and Iraq (15). This specific information is significant as the author later uses it for an effective comparison with the ten-year Vietnam War.
Not only can people learn how to tackle issues using different tactics, but they also learn about the true “warrior” within. People can challenge and test their own theories on “war” and use Sun Tzu’s maxims to modify their usual ways of thinking and behaving as
But we in it shall be remembered-” (40 - 42). After reminding the men of the great respect they will earn in battle, the men realize how winning their battle would have many benefits. Instantly emotionally invested in a victory, the men become more motivated to
When considering the depiction of war in literature, Timothy Findley's The Wars and the short film Coward stand out as two works that offer unique perspectives on the subject. While both portray the realities of war, they use different elements to convey their messages. The similarities and differences between the two works, the ways in which they aid in understanding war conditions, the impact of the visual medium, and the strategies and techniques employed are all important to consider when comparing The Wars and Coward. When comparing The Wars and Coward, it is clear that both works contain similar images and elements, such as the portrayal of soldiers' fear, courage, and sacrifice. However, the way in which these themes are conveyed is vastly different between the two works.
Anderson’s work created an origin of modern warfare, it failed to compare European military experience of soldiers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century with that of more recent military experience. Instead of writing so much about the numerical superiority of forces or trade, it should have taken into account the effects on the soldiers. He argued successfully that the economics of Europe of this period represented the increasing bureaucracy and expenditure of modern armies, but did not display an overall qualitative argument of experience and operations. It is more rational that the origin began at the start of the eighteenth century with more examples of meritocracy, increasing loyalty to the state, and less desertion among armies. The secondary sources were at best average, and the bibliography did not exhibit the full list of sources.
Parallels can be discovered between modern soldiers’ struggles in Syria and the struggles of ancient brotherhoods like the three hundred who fought at Thermopylae. In the continuing war on terrorism, heroic courage, homeland security, and militaristic protection seem to be growing ideas; the fact of the matter is, these “modern” ideas have been present for centuries, stemming from the classical Spartans. The traditions of Spartan conformity, self-sacrifice, and commitment combined with twenty-five centuries of emulation of their classical values of duty, honor, and courage can be seen in in the minds of soldiers today. Modern soldiers need to selflessly