Stump's Two Constraints Of Suffering

3. The State of Questions

The Thomist philosophy holds the great evil can separate man from God, while the great good is a loving union with God . Stumps, then, underlines suffering as a way to temper the human soul. The account of God’s love and the human desire for unity between God and man are morally sufficient reason for understanding God’s allowing of suffering. So, every act of suffering directly benefits the sufferer, and it is entirely willed by God .

Suffering is justified by appealing to a greater good. However, more popular theodicies or defences in McNaughton’s view, try to justify the suffering of some people by appealing it to a greater benefit given to others. The difficulty is: is it sufficient to have the moral justification

The negative benefit of suffering, where one is rescued into the processing of her justification or her sanctification. Here, suffering prevents one from the permanent separation from God. While the positive benefit of suffering is undergone after the processes of union with God . Stump then summarizes that suffering for negative benefit is morally justified if it is involuntary simpliciter, and suffering for positive benefit is morally justified if it is involuntary secundum quid, that is, the suffering is justified if and only if the sufferer either explicitly or tacitly consents to such suffering .

Stump’s two constraints of suffering, argues Draper, could not be taken place automatically in human experience. There is a group of people who cannot be justified by the negative benefit of harm prevention since they are sufficiently far away from the process of sanctification, and from the treatment of permanent separation with God. There are also those who do not consent to suffer for the future benefit of deeper union with God . Moreover, it is quite difficult to know how God knows exactly the human reaction to situations of suffering before allowing