Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC), and at all times relevant to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (HDSP). On February 27, 2014, Plaintiff was brought before the Full Classification Committee, in which it was determined he was suitable for housing in general population. Am. Compl. at 16. During this Classification Committee meeting, Plaintiff did not state that he could not be housed with inmate Ruiz because they were enemies. Id. at 6-7. On February 28, 2014, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with inmate Ruiz. Id. As a result of this altercation, inmate Ruiz died and Plaintiff was subsequently charged and found guilty of battery and murder. …show more content…
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Rainone and Nash failed to protect Plaintiff from a “foreseeable inmate assault” and were “deliberate [sic] indifferent to the Plaintiff’s right to be free from inmate assault.” Am. Compl. at 12-21. Plaintiff further contends that Defendants Pugh and Neven conspired against the Plaintiff to “obstruct the due course of justice.” Id. at 22. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Neven, Nash, and Cox, who is not a named defendant, were “deliberate [sic] indifferent to the Plaintiff’s personal safety by their failure” to create adequate procedures for handling “PREA cases” (Prison Rape Elimination Act). Id. at …show more content…
Am. Compl. at 15. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Nash was negligent by “carelessly” moving the Plaintiff into the same unit as inmate Ruiz. Am. Compl. at 7-8, 16. However, negligence cannot give rise to action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1969). (“In order to be actionable under section 1983 … we believe that more than an isolated incident of negligent failure to protect must be alleged. The federal courts have stated on numerous occasions that absent unusual circumstances they will not intervene in the internal administration of state prison systems.”). In Plaintiff’s opposition, he argues that the second cause of action is not a Section 1983 claim, but a claim for “negligence under state law constituting a tort.” However, even accepting that as true, Plaintiff failed to comply with NRS 41.031. NRS 41.031