Analysis Of Moravcsik's Two Level Game Theory

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New theoretical model The new theoretical model draws its main assumptions from the liberal theory of international relations, or the new liberalism, as it was labelled by Moravcsik (Moravcsik 1997; Moravcsik 2009), which was challenged by other scholars, as described by (Hasenclever (2017, 77). Thus, it is assumed that inner state actors play the crucial role of preference creation, and that cooperation at the international level is possible. Moravcsik has identified three main assumptions of the liberal theory of international relations. The first one is that individuals and private groups are fundamental actors in international politics “in which the demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics”…show more content…
He points out that “foreign policy and international relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and noneconomic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and institutional arrangement” (Putnam 1988, 432). Risse – Kappen studied how public opinion and domestic structure can affect the foreign policies of liberal states. His results indicate that public opinion and interest groups may affect coalition building (Risse-Kappen 1991, 482). However, the impact of domestic factors, including public opinion, depends on whether state institutions are strong or weak. States with weak institutions are more responsive to domestic demands, while states with strong institutions are more reluctant to respond to domestic pressure (Risse-Kappen 1991). Baum and Potter propose an interdisciplinary approach “that incorporates public opinion, elite preferences, and the mass media as independent strategic actors with distinct preferences and incentives” (Baum & Potter 2008,…show more content…
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