Argument Against Moral Inferentialism Summary

In Response to McGrath’s Dilemma Against Moral Inferentialism
An influential argument for moral skepticism is the moral regress argument (Sayre-McCord 1996). Moral inferentialists, who think we do have genuine moral knowledge, argue against the moral regress argument by rejecting the picture of justification one finds in the moral regress argument. Sarah McGrath (2004), in order to make room for her non-inferential moral perception account of moral knowledge, presents a dilemma against moral inferentialism, the thesis that all of our moral knowledge of particular cases is inferential. In particular, she challenges the most compelling version of moral inferentialism, which I call moral bridge inferentialism. In this paper, I argue that both horns of McGrath’s apparent dilemma turn out to lack argumentative weight against the moral bridge inferentialist. As a result, I conclude that moral bridge inferentialists can both survive McGrath’s dilemma and, even better, need not commit themselves to one particular horn of her dilemma.

In Section 1, I sketch the moral regress argument for moral skepticism. In Sections 2-3, I present the views of how we come to possess our moral knowledge which are relevant for my discussion. I motivate and describe both McGrath’s perceptual account and the compelling inferentialist view which McGrath targets with her dilemma: moral bridge inferentialism. In Section 4, I give McGrath’s dilemma against moral bridge inferentialism and respond to both horns of the dilemma. Finally, I conclude my discussion with considering the status of McGrath’s dilemma in light of this paper. I also suggest what else can be done by those attempting to refute McGrath and her particular brand of moral