Argument For Desire Satisfactionism

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the theory. My argument proceeds in 4 sections: In the first section, I will articulate Lukas’ argument for self-regarding restriction and why idealized restriction does not work well. In the second section, I will show that Lukas’ argument for self-regarding restriction is not the best form of argument for Desire Satisfactionism, for the restriction that only desires which are relevant to well-being are counted can encompass irrelevant desires as well. In the third section, I will offer a response on Lukas’ behalf. Finally, in the fourth section, I conclude that this rejoinder is unsuccessful. According to Desire Satisfactionism, one’s well-being increases when one’s desire is satisfied and conversely one’s well-being decreases when one’s desire is frustrated. The theory only takes into account satisfying intrinsic desires to increase one’s well-being. It is also important to note that any knowledge or feelings of satisfaction here is not essential to the desire being satisfied (Lukas, 2010 pp.3). As long as it really did happen in the world, the desire is satisfied and well-being increases. Desire Satisfactionism is more appealing as compared to mental-state theorists as it can account for our intuition why life is not just about what’s occurring in our mental states; we want…show more content…
However, it turns out to be a lie. His paintings are bad, but his friends do not wish to hurt him, thus praising his artworks. According to Hedonism, the painter lives a good life and deception is good for him. But no one would want to live in a deception. Desire Satisfactionism on the other hand, would be able to explain why deception is bad. The painter desires that his paintings are good. Though he does not realize that, in reality his paintings are bad and thus his desires are frustrated. Therefore, his well-being would not increase and deception is bad for
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