Ariane 4 Case Study

Before commenting on specific points of the Ariane 5 launch failure, I feel it's necessary to present the scenario, initial warnings that might have signaled a potential issue with the software, and finally an analysis of the determined problem, and how it could have been caught during the development phase.
Note that my comments aren't meant to frame any particular person or group involved in the development of the Ariane 5 software, rather they are meant to offer a conclusion as to why certain decisions were made regarding the software.
The Ariane 5, successor to the Ariane 4 line of heavy lift launch vehicles, was slated for lift-off on
June 4 1996. Initial flight preparations, as described by the Inquiry Board, proceeded as planned;
weather

(1998)
Remember that the Ariane 5 succeeds the Ariane 4, and even though both share many similarities in both design and operation, they do have their differences. The Board pointed out that Ariane 5 carried over software from Ariane 4 since Ariane 4 has proven to be successful in the past. While this is all well and good, it doesn't change the fact that Ariane 5 made changes in operation, specifically alignment after take-off. I can understand specification re-use, as it save time, money, and offers proven results. Many products and services may rely on similar specifications, but not all products and services may meet the specification in its entirety. As an example, most electric griddles may meet similar requirements, such as pre-heat time and shutdown sequence, but some may vary in duration of applying heat (regardless of desired temperature). If I were to rely on information from the griddle's computer, I could very well carry it over to a similar griddle and get similar results. I should, however, not be surprised when one specific value is off, as it is not the same model of griddle I had originally retrieved the information