’ In a more modern context ‘The notion of ‘total war’ is commonly used within military history to describe a totality of effort, meaning the full mobilization of civil, economic and military sectors for war.’ This, however, is only one of several depictions of ‘total war’. It can be argued that ‘total war’ only is an ideology, and furthermore that it always existed only as a theory. ‘Both Ernst Jünger and Erich Ludendorff did not accepts the totality of the Great War, dissatisfied with the outcome of the war and Germany’s loss, they argued that their country had not committed fully, and both felt that
Can an antiquated lens provide an adequate examination and understanding of modern warfare? The theories of Carl von Clausewitz retain remarkable contemporary merit and relevance in explaining the critical elements affecting warfare in the modern era. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories of war endeavor to be comprehendible, comprehensive, and strategic. Clausewitz contends that the conduct of war itself is without doubt very difficult. But the difficulty is not that erudition and great genius are necessary to understand the basic principles of warfare.1 Clausewitz 's 1812 essay, the Principles of War, offers military commanders, with little campaign experience, a comprehendible, comprehensive, and strategic model for attaining victory in battle.
There main interest is stability and their worst threat is civil war (Geddes, 2004: 11-13). Consequently, the most important concern for many officers deciding whether to join a coup conspiracy is their assessment of how many other officers will join (Geddes, 2004: 13). Military regimes tend to split when challenged, because military regimes are more likely to negotiate their own withdrawal and to democratize (Geddes, 2004: 6). Personal regimes are different from both military and single-party regimes, because on individual dominates the military, state apparatus and the ruling party. Personalist regimes rarely leave office voluntarily and more often end in popular uprising, revolution, invasion or assassination (Geddes, 2004:6).
Many people say that World War I was one of the bloodiest conflicts that the world had ever seen. There are many reasons why people think this and one of them is due to the innovations in military during the late 1800´s. The world powers had expected a short war, but that was not the case. The immediate cause of World War I was the assassination of archduke of Austria-Hungary, Franz Ferdinand. But this was not the only cause of the First World War.
As a result of publishing this piece, it brought hate to Paine and yet praise to him. The simple fifty page pamphlet attempted to drive many Americans unwilling to break from Great Britain and to rebel and become part of the independence. By doing so, he declared that Britain was overtaking the American’s lives, the English form of government had an unscrupulous King. Despite this happening, George Washington believed that after reading “Common Sense” to the soldiers, they were refreshed and developed the desire to fight the war unconditionally till a winner was brought upon the two sides. George Washington declared that “Common Sense” drove the war into their favor, and thus quoted, “I find Common Sense is working a powerful change in the minds of men” (Bigelow 102- 103).
The Unpreventable Great War World War I was one of the most devastating and destructive events that occurred during history. It was inevitable to happen due to three main factors including, militarism, nationalism, and alliances between certain countries. However, there are other people who believe that World War I was not inevitable and could have been prevented through certain measures. This source describes that World War I could have been prevented if there were more stable and successful negotiations between countries. However, due to the lack of peaceful negotiations between certain countries, many conflicts arose because of desires to expand military and navels.
The proliferation of nuclear arms during the Cold War was thus to deter against aggression from the other power by reducing benefits and raising the cost of facing retaliatory capabilities that will keep the other side in fear of striking first. Nuclear deterrence can also be precarious where missteps could easily spiral, as seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis when US and USSR came close to having a nuclear war. After the collapse of the USSR and with the increase in nuclear states, nuclear proliferation became a renewed security concern as the source for deterrence have changed and nuclear arms have increased destructive power. The incentive of nuclear deterrence in ensuring the security of states could cause a proliferation of nuclear weapons, further increasing the number of dyads in the already multipolar system. A neo-realist like John Mearsheimer will argue that since multipolarity breeds instability, the increase in dyads creates greater imbalances in power which makes deterrence harder and more prone to miscalculations that could easily escalate to nuclear war, and is hence a great security
The great military theorist Carl von Clausewitz put it another way: "Tactics is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war." (Goodman, 2018, pg. 1) Strategy and tactics, however, have been viewed differently in almost every era
In the first half of the twentieth century, Europe suffered incessant and unprecedented detrimental effects of their political decisions. They were inciting the wars. Wars seemed to be a normal method for the countries to protect their territories and interest and solve the conflicts, but the wars like World War One and World War Two which happened in the first half of the twentieth century were different from others. They are the closest counterfeits of total war, in which the countries engaged devote themselves to war by total mobilization, sacrificing lives, or other ways like economically and socially to fight for a victory. The distinction between soldier and civilian seemed to be continuously eroded amid the wars.
Propaganda and misdirection has become a worldwide political strategy. Harold Lasswell's propaganda theories seemed to carry the weight of real world proof, the world had been submerged by a devastating world war, The War to End All Wars in fact, yet global turmoil continued to rage. These conflicts were infused with worldly and apparently successful propaganda. Yet there was an opposition. One outstanding critic of propaganda theory was philosopher John Dewey.
The Echo of Battle: The Army’s way of War The Echo of Battle: The Army’s way of War, by Brian McCallister Linn; is an informative book that gives understanding on how war has defined the United States, whether it’s the Gettysburg, Iraq or the invisible battle that the military is fighting. United States favorite approach is through weapons and not much skills. However, it also explains that once weapons become silent or when there aren’t as many victories during war, the developing of new strategies becomes a key focus for the United States military. The Army focusing on new strategies and ways could better prepare them for the technology advances in today’s wars against other countries. The attack on 9/11 is the excuse for causing war or
foreign policy and military tactics. One major change was the diversification of intel gathering sources relying less on technology and more on people. The way they valued informant information changed as well. The failure of the op made the military realize that the decisive terrain in combat is human terrain meaning that without significant first hand intel the success of an operation cannot be guaranteed. Probably the most important lesson learned is that the media plays a much larger role in war today than in previous wars.
Book Review 2: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises by Richard Betts Summary: Betts starts off his book by recognizing the ambiguity around the advocacy of the use of force in a crisis by military leaders even though there is a prevalent assumption that military professionals are more aggressive than diplomats and politicians. He states he writes the book in order to provide a comprehensive survey of the postwar role of American military men in decisions on their most essential function, their use of force in combat. Betts acknowledges the vast availability of literature on military participation in decisions on defense budgets and weapons procurement, but feels there is a void when looking at decision-making from the perspective of military leadership versus civilian leadership. The book addresses four principle questions. First, when the use of force was an issue, what did military advisers recommend compared to civilian advisers?
Walt’s article, The Secret to America’s Foreign-Policy Success (And Failure), describes several foreign policy accomplishments and successes over the last decades by citing several examples of U.S. involvement in global issues. Walt argues that the foreign policy failures are more substantial and overshadowed successful policies. He disputes this in the article by juxtaposing notable U.S. foreign policy accomplishment in 1993 with today’s foreign policy debacles. Walt believes that U.S. foreign policy often fails because officials set unrealistic goals, U.S. military force is overused, and U.S. equities are placed ahead of state’s interests. Walt’s makes a convincing argument that the failures of the last two decades are in part attributed to U.S. foreign policy officials setting unrealistic goals, specifically, trying to stimulate democratic governments and free market economies in unstable states.
Three decades of American policy in Vietnam had failed. According to Michael Lind, he concludes in his book, Vietnam: The Necessary War, “the United States may have won tactically in the Tet Offensive, but the excessive costs of winning badly by means of an ill-conceived attrition strategy in South Vietnam made a U.S. withdrawal as a result of domestic pressure inevitable.” The threat of Tet helped define and limit America’s international behavior. Clearly, control over the historical recollection of Vietnam had become a foreign policy strategy as well, for, as George Orwell had cautioned, those who define the past can control the present and thus the future. The legacy of Vietnam is much more complex than the revisionists would have