Chanel V. Scanel: A Medical Malpractice Case

April 1, 1995, an eleven-year-old girl, Chanel was looking out her bedroom window when she spotted a bag on the ledge of her building. Chanel proceeded to call her sister, Tashawn, who took it upon herself to climb onto the roof and rescue what turned out to be an infant from the bag. They immediately called 911 and while following the operator’s instructions, tied off the baby’s umbilical cord. Emergency Medical Services arrived at their apartment shortly after and suggested that Chanel was the baby’s mother and that she had thrown it out of the window, where it had ended up on the ledge. Carol Armstrong, Chanel’s mother, arrived home to the officers repeating their accusations and continuously insisted that Chanel be taken to the hospital

Chanel then proceeded to sue Dr. Takla, Dr. Mohammad Rahman, the pediatric emergency room attending physician on duty; Darryl Coach; a social worker for Brookdale; and Brookdale. Although Chanel made several claims, the only claims that were actually relevant to her case and situation were as follows: medical malpractice case against Dr. Takla, Dr. Lewis, and Dr. Rahman; violation of New York Public Health Law 2805, which is just stating that a healthcare provider must obtain informed consent before performing a medical procedure, or else they can be held liable; Direct and vicarious hospital negligence; and finally, battery against Dr. Takla and Dr. Lewis. Although the plaintiff’s complaint contained a vicarious liability claim against Brookdale, the Armstrong jury was not charged that it could find the hospital negligent on a vicarious liability theory. The court, instead, told the jury that the plaintiff’s theory of negligence was that the hospital had an absence of proper written policies of procedures, poor training, and lack of experience in the emergency room staff. The plaintiffs also claimed the hospital failed to require its staff to follow well-recognized and established administrative regulations and hospital procedures. The plaintiff did not object to the omission of vicarious liability. Because the theory of hospital negligence submitted to the jury was subordinate, they must determine whether the record contained evidence from which a jury could conclude that the hospital itself went away from the standard care of practice. The defendant’s remaining arguments were as follows: they claim that two pieces of evidence were containing admissions by Carol Armstrong and that she had consented to the exams, and that the consent was very wrongfully