Deepen Steinberg Contractarianism

Chapter 1

Deepening Steinberg’s Argument through contractarian perspective

Introduction

Steingberg (2009:1069) in his response to Lang and Scott (2009) argued that the committee delegates in the WTO are primarily representatives of their states, and therefore they primarily push their agenda in the informal discussions. He claimed that influence of these ‘technocrats’ demonstrated by Lang and Scott is over-exaggerated. In his description of the US representative to the Service Council, he argued that the representative is both an ‘American’ as well as a ‘global manager’, but first and foremost he or she is an American. Steinberg described these delegates as mere figureheads of national higher-level politicians. This Chapter argues that

He argues that rationality and reasonableness emphaise different aspects of human nature. Rationality emphasizes the passive side of human nature, our capacity to be pleased and satisfied. In the weighting system it is usually the one that has the highest ranking and best utility. On the other hand, reasonableness emphasizes the active side of our human nature; our own capacity for control and constraint. The absolute constraint remains unaffected by individuals’ preferences and tests. Wong summarises this dichotomy, as the former is more concerned about the notion of good, while the later is more concerned about the notion of right. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go further in depth of the contractarian discussions, but the dichotomy between good and right is at the heart of the a variety of discourses in global governance. The weighting technique employed by Hobbes has been the major methodology of variety of landmark

Rousseau and Rawls belong to this tradition since both of them emphasise that the social contract not only defines principles of ‘right’, but also represent the fundamental good of people. The distinctive feature of hybrid contractarianism is a dual assumption that reasonableness and rationality are both aspects of a practical reason. Accordingly the analytical method consists of two techniques. The rational perspective uses the weighting model to rank preferences of people. Meanwhile, the reasonable perspective uses the testing model to assess the justifiability of people’s actions. This approach has been advocated by Brink who proposes that dualism of practical reason consists of the categorical imperative and the categorical prudence. Elster built on this dual understanding of practical reason and argued that the two aspects are independent. Accordingly, he argued that a good life is a life in which rationality and impartiality are harmonious with each other. Rawls in a hybrid contractarian tradition adopted a similar position as he argued that the conception of rationality and reasonableness must have equal status in practical reason. Freeman commented on Rawls’ writing that ‘there are two ideal perspectives in Rawls conception of justice: the original position and the deliberative