In the Groundwork, the notion of the good does not rely on feeling or sensation; rather than it derives from the rational directly. Kant points out that every motive has an intended effect on the world. When desire drives us, we first examine the possibilities that the world leaves open to us, selecting some effect at which we wish to aim. But, if we act in accord with practical moral law, we encounter a significant difference since the only possible object of the practical law is the Good, since the Good is always an appropriate object for the practical law. Viewing the Good as rational consolidates
His definition equivocates knowledge and courage itself, rather than saying knowledge is necessary for courage. However, knowledge is not the only necessary condition for courage in his definition. Thus, the particulars of fearful and hopeful become problematic for Socrates. As Socrates points out through further questioning if one were to have such knowledge as stated by Nicias - one would have knowledge of all virtues, “of practically all goods and evils put together” (199d1). The elenctic method draws out contradictions in Nicias beliefs, leading again to a conflicted answer.
Elkin for example indicates the distinction by declaring that causation as a topic is discussed only implicitly in the Enquiry where as it is discussed explicitly in the Treatise (5). The job of the critic had been made more strenuous due to the marginally varied standpoints of the two works. The Treatise is strengthened through an intricate psychological theory of knowledge: Hume does not concern himself with causality but instead the evidence for causal beliefs (6) The key question in Book 1, part 3 of the Treatise is the source of the notion of causality. At the beginning at least, Hume is willing to declare the sole relationship at the basis of science may be that it may follow beyond our perceptions. It notifies us that there are objects we usually do not perceive as causation (7).
In history it was said that human knowledge is obtainable through unconventional of senses. According to traditional rationalists the actual source of knowledge was the natural or inborn ideas. According to traditional rationalists sense perception was a poor or not a reliable way seek knowledge. EXAMPLE: If it is a matter of god then the rationalists cannot claim to be a stern atheist i.e. he cannot just state that ‘’ God doesn’t exist’’.
Aristotle did, however, acknowledge that the mean may not be the same for everyone or consistent throughout all circumstances. This description of virtue differs significantly from the description provided by Plato in his dialogues. Plato claimed that virtue is a type of knowledge since qualities are only beneficial when they are accompanied by knowledge. Virtue is always beneficial, thus, it must be a form of knowledge. If virtue is knowledge, vice – being the opposite of virtue – must be the lack of knowledge.
In this respect, morality and Socratism are the expressions of a vital drive analogous to those which give birth to the figures of Apollo and Dionysus, as they are both connected to the metaphysical inquiry into the nature of things. Still, the Socratic worldview fails in seeing its dependency and connections to these drives, and thus fails to see its connection to life and its irrational kernel . According to Nietzsche, this mindset is the result of a pathology, as it gives too much merit to appearances while it excludes the Will from its view, making the former absolute and arranging them in a rational but insincere way. Socratism is then made of the same substance of the drives which inspire tragedy insofar as it is an expression of life, but, in both a literal and a metaphysical sense, it is the result of a sick form of this substance – it presents a metaphysical view of reality, just like art, but at the same time causes life to retreat within the safe walls of reasonableness, as by contrast art pushes the person to transcend them . In some respect, we can see here one of the seeds of Nietzsche’s later intuitions, and I believe there is no harm in employing them to elucidate this point.
Nietzsche ‘s critique on the traditional concept of responsibility is heavy handed and sometimes quite harsh. It’s ludicrous to believe in this traditional notion, firstly because responsibility and moral judgement is merely a construct and, secondly, free will cannot account for a cause to an action or effect. Nietzsche criticises western notion of responsibility through deconstructing conceptuality and causality. Both are concepts which are, such as language, manmade constructs- fictions. Language is used to communicate, but not to thoroughly explain.
The dual vision of language that Habermas employs allows a distinction between 'procedural' and 'substantial' to emerge. We have a scheme of an ideal speech situation on the one hand, and manifold practices on the other. According to Mouffe, this distinction 'cannot be maintained and one must acknowledge that procedures always involve substantial ethical commitments.' (Mouffe 1999, 749) When Tully stresses this issue of Habermasian dualism he argues that our judgments are not entirely distinct from our everyday communicative practices. 'One reason for his misunderstanding is the overly sharp distinction he draws between the reflective grounding of speech acts in justifications and the mere de facto acceptance of habitual practices.'
He furthermore explains that sense experience is somehow misleading through the allegory of the cave by implying that “what we feel and see might not be the truth”. He claims that our souls go through the process of recollection from the realm of forms. He believes that true knowledge is gained only through reason and philosophical reflection. However, Aristotle holds another view, he believes that change is genuine and in the importance of sense experience and observation. He emphasizes that sensible objects are what makes up the real world and each material object has existence of its own.
A précising definition is different from both Stipulative definition and lexical definition. It differs from Stipulative definition in the sense that its definiendum is not a new term, but one with a known usage, although it being vague or ambiguous. Therefore, when constructing a precise definition, we are not at liberty to assign the definiendum any meaning we want. A precise definition cannot be a simple report like that of lexical definition because it has to be beyond established usage if the vagueness of the definiendum is to be reduced (Copi, Cohen and Mcmahon). Précising definitions are used because in some cases we need to use a particular term in a way that is more precise than a definition found in the dictionary.