Critical Analysis Of Edmund Husserl's Theory Of Intentionality
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In this thesis I intend to provide a critical assessment of the Theory of Intentionality. The term intentionality is of medieval Scholastic origin. It was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano and later adopted by Edmund Husserl. Intentionality is a central topic in the philosophy of mind in general, and in Husserl’s phenomenology in particular. It lies at the heart of Husserl’s philosophy. To a great extent, Husserl’s theory of intentionality is the same as his phenomenology. Phenomenology deals with our experiences. It studies how we experience things as individuals. The core structure of any experience is intentionality. According to Husserl, the essence of consciousness is intentionality.
A chief problem of intentionality, briefly…show more content… (C) Significance of the Research
As a discipline, phenomenology has been central to the tradition of continental European philosophy in the 20th century. Husserl’s phenomenology has been formulated around the concept of intentionality. He has spent more than forty years examining the concept. Intentionality itself has played a fundamental role in analytic philosophy in general and in phenomenology in particular (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/). Intentionality is significant as it enables phenomenologists to work on the relation between that which is within consciousness and that which is transcendent or extends beyond it.
(D) Statement of the Problem (hypothesis)
The purpose of this thesis will be to tackle some questions such as:
-Are there intentional…show more content… An intentional object does not need to always be noticed or attended to. To illustrate the difference, the example of a box is used. We see the box; however, we do not see our sensations. We are always seeing one and same box, even if it is turned or tilted. We have the same ‘content of consciousnesses’ – if we consider the perceived object a content of consciousness. However, each turn or tilt of the box yields to a new ‘content of consciousness’ – if we consider the experienced contents as ‘contents of consciousnesses’. Thus, extremely different contents are therefore experienced, even though the same object is perceived (The Shorter Logical Investigations, P. 219 - 221). “The experienced content, generally speaking, is not the perceived object” (The Shorter Logical Investigations, P.