The Second Way is similar to the First as Aquinas constantly reiterates the importance of ‘a first cause’ therefore he ultimately dispels the idea of infinite regress. He speaks of ‘efficient cause’ and how every event or thing needs an efficient cause and nothing can efficiently cause itself. A critical view of this could be to ask if nothing can efficiently cause itself how is there a first mover and how is it caused? For Aquinas, however, it is necessary to have a first mover or else cause and effect cannot exist. Some of the greatest opponents to the cosmological argument include Hume, Kant and Russell.
Kant argued that it was Hume's philosophy, flinched from the "dogmatism". However, in the changed context and something unlike Hume, Kant had just sense a source of moral norms. The changed context consisted in the fact that Kant does not ask how to justify all value judgments in the same way, rather than separately dealing with the so-called morality in the narrow sense, that is, the attitudes on which it is possible to agree all and make them subject to an obligation or duty and other value judgments in which it sets the request. This difference, which extends along ethic is well understood. You can consider that a good deal of long
Contemporary virtue theories do not grasp nor represents the Aristotelian theory, because they think that it is impossible to escape the charge of relativism in virtue ethics. According to the relativist approach, ethical goodness is relative to each society depending on its traditions and practices. It is thought that virtue can only be outlined locally with reference to a single locale. Relativists reject the idea that there is a general rule, based on specific virtuous actions, that leads to the good life i.e. they reject that there is a single virtue (or norm of flourishing life) that is able to flourish the life of all human beings.
In his article “Framing Moral Intuitions”, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong sets out to reject moral intuitionalism by questioning whether moral intuitions can be justified non-inferentially. He defines a moral intuition as a strong and immediate belief (Sinnott-Armstrong, 47) and for it to be justified non-inferentially is to be able to justify it independently of any other belief (Sinnott-Armstrong, 48). His primary aim is to demonstrate that many of our moral intuitions are unreliable and consequently, that no moral intuition can be justified without inference. He does this by citing several studies that demonstrate how moral intuitions can be subject to “framing effects”. Framing effects are the effects that wording and context can have on our
He also defended materialism. Materialism is also a form of Skepticism because the concept is that “all facts are dependant upon physical processes” (Britannica, materialism). John Locke’s The Limit of Human Understanding supports Thomas Hobbes’s ideas as he argues the limit of human understanding. Hobbes’s argument that human being followed pleasure and pain shows the Skepticism of the purity of human knowledge. Consequently Skepticism plays the role of how much human knowledge is legitimate therefore the human being will accept the limited role of being a citizen to the
The Evil Demon can alter thoughts to the point where even they cannot be relied upon (Cahn 535). To Descartes, this is the strongest argument for skepticism. For this reason, from now on, I will focus on how the Cogito relates to this skeptical argument. Descartes needs a foundation to progress his argument in the rest of the Meditations in order to prove the existence of God, and of Body. From now on, we will assume that Descartes successful proved that our senses, our body, and anything that we believe to be true is not reliable.
In Response to McGrath’s Dilemma Against Moral Inferentialism An influential argument for moral skepticism is the moral regress argument (Sayre-McCord 1996). Moral inferentialists, who think we do have genuine moral knowledge, argue against the moral regress argument by rejecting the picture of justification one finds in the moral regress argument. Sarah McGrath (2004), in order to make room for her non-inferential moral perception account of moral knowledge, presents a dilemma against moral inferentialism, the thesis that all of our moral knowledge of particular cases is inferential. In particular, she challenges the most compelling version of moral inferentialism, which I call moral bridge inferentialism. In this paper, I argue that both horns of McGrath’s apparent dilemma turn out to lack argumentative weight against the moral bridge inferentialist.
who concludes that ‘rational nature cannot be valuable in a Kantian world’. Actually, there are Kantians working on issues whether rationality could identify moral law. According to Hill, aside from Korsgarrd’s objection to realism, there are mainly two doubts whether Kant implies value realism. The first doubt arises from epistemological concerns. Kant states that it is possible for all of us to possess moral knowledge; given that we construct value it is clearly plausible that we can know what is valuable.
In effect, Thrasymachus tries to invalidate the entire notion that justice should be a guiding moral principle: a strict or universal definition within these terms is not only unnecessary but also factually incorrect. This view presents an pessimistic position on the nature of humanity, and seems to suggest that there are no intrinsically good ways to live one’s life or structure a society. One could characterize these beliefs as a kind of nihilism. The idea of justice, from this point of view, is purely used under pragmatic
Yet, the constructivist view of Kantian ethics may present a contradiction: if morality is entirely constructed by human rationality, then there should not be a universal principle which one would need “to receive” in order to regulate decisions. Thus, as Kant rejects authority and experience, through reason and textual analysis, drawing both from Kant’s writing and Augustine’s City of God, it is imperative to reconcile the conflict between the realist—that morality exists independent of rationality—and constructivist readings of Kant’s ethics. That “in practical common reason, when it cultivates itself, a dialectic inadvertently unfolds [...] and one is therefore [unable] to find rest anywhere but in a complete critique of our reason” lends credence a constructivist