2) The importance of sympathy in the Humean framework Using the experimental method, the three books of Treatise discuss the following three wide-ranging topics: human understanding, the passions and morals. The notion of sympathy has a pivotal role in the last two books. Hume describes sympathy as a “very powerful principle in human nature,” which can change our sentiments and ways of thinking, or at least “disturb the easy course” of our thought. The laudation of sympathy as the most remarkable quality in human nature praises our propensity to “receive by communication their [the others’] inclinations and sentiments.” In the Humean account of human nature, sympathy is the mechanism through which we have the ability to “enter so deep into
In other words, reason is not concerned with morality but with speculative truth such as those of mathematics and physics. Morality for him is based on sentiments, natural feeling, natural tendencies and passion. These are what move man to action and they determine the choice of action. Moral approval and disapproval are based not just on rationality but also on sentiments, feelings and emotions. We approve actions to be good because of its natural inclinations and also because it pleases us, and we disapprove actions to be evil because there are no natural inclinations and also because they displease us.
Essentially, it may be identified as placing emphasis on the virtues and moral character as opposed to deontology which places emphasis on rules and duties, or consequentialism whereby emphasis is placed on consequences as a result of certain actions. However, this is not to say that each of the above approaches cannot all make room for virtues, consequences, and/or rules and duties. In fact, any plausible normative ethics approach will have something to say about all three. Essentially, virtue ethics can be distinguished from consequentialism and deontology as the importance of virtue within the theory itself. Unlike the alternative ethical theories mentioned above, virtue ethics is not associated with a moral imperative.
His way of thinking was immensely influential on the subject of utilitarianism, the philosophy of science and sensationalism. David Hume was born April 26th, 1711 to a poor Scottish family who lived in the northern area of Edinburgh, Scotland. His childhood didn’t last very long as he enrolled in college at the ripe
Hutcheson gives illustrations of this: for instance, people do not “approve as virtuous the eating a bunch of grapes, taking a glass of wine, or sitting down when tired” . The point is that moral approvals and disapprovals done by our moral sense are specific in nature and only operate when there is an action that can be appropriately judged of by our moral sense. Reasoning and information can change the evaluation of the moral sense, but no amount of reasoning can or does precede the moral sense in regard to its approval of what is for the public good. The moral sense approves of the good for others. This concern for others by the moral sense is what is natural to humankind, Hutcheson contended.
According to Stirling (1999), Hume was also a great philosopher. From an epistemological point of view, he questioned the notions of identity that was personal and argued that that there is nothing as ‘self’ which was permanent and progressive. Hume dismissed the belief of casualty and argued that our concepts of case-effect concerns were based on thinking rather than in causal forces
Describe Schopenhauer’s notion of justice and provide a reason or two to why you would agree or disagree with such an account. I agree with Schopenhauer that compassion is the true and only basis of moral action because compassion is what shows what kind of people we really are and what our basis of moral actions are. In the text, “When an action is characterized by an extraordinary absence of compassion, it bears the certain stamp of the deepest depravity and loathsomeness” (Schopenhauer, 106). Our actions show our character. Compassion is what defines us and it shows others what we our morals are.
Despite being primarily known as an economist, Adam Smith assumed the role of a moral philosopher in writing The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In the work, he develops a unique moral theory that intertwines a reality based on human observation with an ideal that arises from Smith’s thoughts on the way people should be. In order to establish a foundation, Smith begins by describing the feeling of sympathy as being one that is shared by all humans. His discourse on sympathy, formed predominantly on observations, shifts to the theoretical topic of judging the propriety or impropriety of others and ourselves. These judgments are what ultimately form the basis of what is just and what is unjust, often being abstracted into general rules about justice.
By holding sentience and self-consciousness as key to determining moral status, we are left with a 'moral continuum', upon which there will be cases where some non-human animals will require equal moral status with some humans, and certain circumstances in which they will be deserving of even greater moral status than some humans. I will argue for this continuum view, where species membership is not the factor deciding an animal's moral status, and which removes any moralistic dividing line between humans and non-human
Thus, they motivate people to focus on others and see how one’s own actions influence the welfare of others (De Hooge et al., 2007). Researchers have highlighted moral emotions as an important element of moral decision-making (Haidt, 2001; Monin et al., 2007; Greene and Haidt, 2002). In previous decades, researches done were mainly focused on only two emotions: guilt and sympathy. However, starting from the 1980’s, the concept of moral emotion has been evolved and expanded to include several positive emotions such as elevation, gratitude and pride. For better understanding, the moral emotions are further classified into four different families which consists of other-condemning family, the self-conscious family, the other-suffering family, and the other-praising family.