David Hume's Skeptical Argument Against Induction

In this philosophical essay, I will be providing a brief introduction of David Hume’s skeptical argument against induction. Also, in order for Hume’s skeptical argument to make sense, I will also be referencing René Descartes’ theory of foundationalism and Sober’s categorization of beliefs into three distinct levels. Furthermore, I claim that both Hume and Descartes’ perspective of how rational justification is defined will always lead to skepticism being true. In addition, I will argue that there exists a valid, alternate perspective which will falsify David Hume’s skeptical argument and allow induction as a valid method of reasoning.

In Elliot Sober’s book, “Core Questions in Philosophy: A Text with Readings”, it is crucial to note that Sober categorizes beliefs into three distinct categories or levels ranging from one to three. To start off, the category of “first-level beliefs” encompasses any sort of indubitable or first-person psychological belief. Secondly, the category of “second-level beliefs” are beliefs which are composed from present and past observations. Lastly, “third-level

Similarly, to determining the truth of a proposition, the rational justification of a proposition is also dependant on the other background assumptions associated with the given proposition. For example, when determining the truth of the proposition: “Is Mary to the left of Suzy?”, we would require many also background assumptions like the premise “I am looking from the front”. Likewise, I believe the same rules apply to the rational justification of a proposition. For example, the justification for my belief that Mary is indeed left of Suzy would require many other “second-level” beliefs including the assumption that I can see both Suzy and Mary in-front of me and that my mind is not deceiving