However, this position does not give an answer to the question that how we can make inferences from various individual cases without any satisfying standards for measure them. In connection with this, unfortunately, it does not explain either how we can assume that we have the knowledge in the first place. It ignores this problem and treats the knowledge as a collection of particularities that are compatible with each other. In this manner, the thing that particularism do seems like just begging the question. Basically, it suggests that we have to be satisfied with this necessary but not sufficient type of understanding what knowledge is and its criteria are.
The ability to think is an innate action that, for the most part, all people possess. Nonetheless, not everybody has the ability or knowledge of how to develop this quality into something greater and beneficial. Critical thinking is not inherent; rather the skills necessary to think analytically must be learned and practiced with an open mind. It involves listening with the intent of understanding others, drawing conclusions based on strong evidence and asking curiously about the situation. Not only must one be willing to evaluate a situation slowly and thoroughly, but one must also respect the views of others and accept the possibility of being wrong.
who concludes that ‘rational nature cannot be valuable in a Kantian world’. Actually, there are Kantians working on issues whether rationality could identify moral law. According to Hill, aside from Korsgarrd’s objection to realism, there are mainly two doubts whether Kant implies value realism. The first doubt arises from epistemological concerns. Kant states that it is possible for all of us to possess moral knowledge; given that we construct value it is clearly plausible that we can know what is valuable.
The author has replied to the different criticisms by presenting different examples and each of them, in the end, concluding that utilitarianism is the best available ethical theory. By holding to only one intrinsic good i.e. happiness, and allowing every individual a voice, in how to achieve it, Mill has ingeniously tried to adapt this ethic globally. The text is also quite organized and well planned. For example, he hasn’t taken a stance, in the beginning, between whether morals are evident a priori or they are deduced from observations and experiences, knowing that it might create problems later.
My belief is that there is a single, universal code. So my moral code emcompasses my own beliefs of what should be right and what should be wrong. I agree with the idea that what is seen as right may be right for one, can be wrong for another, but ultimately there is a morally correct thing to do (Source A). My moral code is mostly based around respect and honesty. Respect also includes
We approve actions to be good because of its natural inclinations and also because it pleases us, and we disapprove actions to be evil because there are no natural inclinations and also because they displease us. Thus, morality is a matter of natural feeling, natural tendencies or inclination and not a question of
I thought that this chapter was interesting because I think in a similar way. He believed that for one to be moral, they need to have an appropriate motive for undertaking a task. It cannot be based on selfish reasons and it does not have to appease the public. You do something because it is right. He also states that we often mistake ideas for our own because of conformity.
It is mere posturing to say that you are for or against “relativism” unless you say what you mean by the term. Moral relativism is the view that moral judgments are true or false only relative to some particular standpoint (for instance, that of a culture or a historical period) and that no standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others. It has often been associated with other claims about morality: notably, the thesis that different cultures often exhibit radically different moral values; the denial that there are universal moral values shared by every human society; and the insistence that we should refrain from passing moral judgments on beliefs and practices characteristic of cultures other than our own. Moral relativism has been identified with all the above positions; and no formula can capture all the ways the term is used by both its advocates and its critics. But it is possible to articulate a position that most who
In this section I would like to compare two different approaches of the before mentioned concepts of ethics and desire. The first theme that I started my paper with is ethics. Both Levinas and Aristotle in their philosophies strove for the higher good, which for one of them was represented by happiness and for another by the notion of G-d. In their perception this higher good is the eternal truth and understanding of the world. For Levinas, however, the ‘good’ is infinite in a sense that it is not concerned in what is common among all things, but what is entirely unique about each person or thing.
The purely formal understanding of freedom and dignity that Hill and other Kantians humanists try to avoid is problematic. The problem, as I see it, is rooted in the denial of any other source of value in the world aside from persons. It is only by virtue of these other values that rational nature can exercise its distinctive capacities in a way that makes it worthy of respect. In sum, my interpretation sees dignity as freedom in the non-formal sense. This value appears to deny independent reality.