In “A Refutation of Moral Relativism,” Peter Kreeft argues that there are no moral absolutes because of the different cultures. Kreeft presents the moral relativism argument in his first two premises, through modus tollens, that if moral absolutism was true, then all would agree and that not everyone agrees. The conclusion that follows is that moral absolutism is false. Although many cultures practice different moral values, it does not mean that there is no absolute morally correct value. Kreeft argues in the first premise that if moral absolutism was true, then all would agree.
A purpose, or even a sensation of purpose is perhaps a necessary element of human existence. The battle to find a purpose is at the heart of much of philosophy, and whole divisions of thought were dedicated to coping with a feeling of meaninglessness, with various degrees of optimism. Some, such as the French author and existentialist philosopher Albert Camus believe “The literal meaning of life is whatever you’re doing that prevents you from killing yourself,” which necessitates embracing an absence of meaning beyond biology. However, some like Paul Tillich believe that one must have the courage to be despite this apparent lack of meaning to live a life without crippling anxiety about our imminent non-existence. One of Tillich’s most famous
Subsequently, I will proceed to form an argument on the first part of Mackie’s argument from queerness, the metaphysical component. I will show that although the conclusion follows from the premises, not all the premises are true. Similarly for the epistemological component of Mackie’s argument, I will prove that the premises from his argument can be refuted. With the failure of both components, I will show that Mackie’s argument from queerness does not succeed in proving that objective values do not exist. Mackie’s argument from queerness is founded upon a naturalistic account of the world.
This is a mystery because it is not concrete and is incalculable. The logic behind untouchable facts is explained as the Principle, “Suppose it's an untouchable fact that p. And suppose also that the following conditional (if-then) statement expresses an untouchable fact: IF p is an untouchable fact, and if if p, then q is an untouchable fact, then q is an untouchable fact” (274-275). He argues that compatibilists hide their mystery under the rug but everyone, including compatibilists themselves, know it is there which, for
Chris McCandless, a very questionable man with questionable motives, were they reasonable or just plain idiotic? Before we go into those questionable areas, let’s ask ourselves; what drives our determination, what fuels our motivation, and why are we going to accomplish our desires? All these answers are found in one simple question; one that man-kind seems to never realize the answer to, “what is the meaning of life?” We fail to see that, we are the very living definition of it, it’s within ourselves that we give life any meaning at all, and to understand why we give it such meaning. McCandless knew this, the life that he was living, was never his, so he decided to search for his meaning and live his own life as his. Before and during his journey he read books by men who heavily focused their lives on philosophy, even their stories carried out their messages of their philosophy on life; which I’m sure influenced, if not, inspired Chris to seek out these philosophies first hand to experience himself.
Lucy Bichakhchyan Introduction to Philosophy Second Short Written Assignment GALEN STRAWSON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY Galen Strawson is a British philosopher, who is famous for his philosophical works on free will, panpsychism, causality, determinism etc. This paper is about his article “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”. The title of the article already gives away the stand that Strawson has considering Moral Responsibility.. He describes the nature of Moral Responsibility as an illusion. There is an argument which he calls “Basic Argument” which proves that humans can not be morally responsible for their actions.
In his article “Framing Moral Intuitions”, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong sets out to reject moral intuitionalism by questioning whether moral intuitions can be justified non-inferentially. He defines a moral intuition as a strong and immediate belief (Sinnott-Armstrong, 47) and for it to be justified non-inferentially is to be able to justify it independently of any other belief (Sinnott-Armstrong, 48). His primary aim is to demonstrate that many of our moral intuitions are unreliable and consequently, that no moral intuition can be justified without inference. He does this by citing several studies that demonstrate how moral intuitions can be subject to “framing effects”. Framing effects are the effects that wording and context can have on our
According to “Authenticity and Identity” by the author, Bob Edelstein, he interprets an identity is classified as values that reflect who a person is. A person having a lack of understanding what their own values are called the term “identity crisis” which is explained by Susan Krauss Whitbourne in the article “Are You Having an Identity Crisis?”. According to Shahram Heshmat, the author of “Basic of Identity”, “Lack of a coherent sense of identity will lead to uncertainty about what one wants to do in the life” (1). This states that if a person has this lack of understanding about their values, can’t fulfil their own qualities. This relates to the characters of A Separate Peace.
A further objection to this argument is that it seems to trade one kind of skepticism for another. According to Thomas Nagel, if the skeptic accepts that he/she cannot actually express a skeptical proposition such as “Maybe I am a brain in a vat,” then he/she can recast the skeptical argument as follows: “Perhaps I can’t even think the truth about what I am, because I lack the necessary concepts and my circumstances make it impossible for me to acquire them!” Nagel concludes that if this is not skepticism, he does not know what
My perception of my body and matter in general is that it is in its essence divisible (Descartes,1641) This essay here will insert a reference to ‘Leibnitz’s Law’ or otherwise the relatively intuitive principle that for two things to be the same thing, they must share all the qualities of each other. Descartes does not specifically do so, but it is heavily inferred from his argument. Descartes now concludes that since minds are indivisible and bodies are, that according to the Leibnitz’s law they cannot be the same thing and hence: Conclusion: The mind is substantively different from the body and indeed matter in general. Because in this conception the mind is substantively distinct from the body it becomes plausible for us to doubt the intuitive connection between mind and body. Indeed there are many aspects of the external world that do not appear to have minds and yet appear none the less real in spite of this for example mountains, sticks or lamps, given this we can begin to rationalize that perhaps minds can exist without bodies, and we only lack the capacity to perceive them.