Without a tangible “thing” to split, it could be argued that divisibility has no real meaning at all in relation to things that by their nature cannot be split. To wit, Descartes’ argument supposes that a mind divided would result in absurdity, such as two fractions of a greater mind, both with capacity to think, or in other words, two new minds, he takes this as evidence that a mind cannot be divided; but it would seem plausible also to say that this absurdity is the result of applying terms that only have meaning when applied to things with extension. In other words; a mind may well be capable of division, even if it was substantively different and separate from matter and body, thus we may conclude that Descartes cannot prove the distinction between mind and matter by ascribing notions of relative divisibility or non-divisibility to them. Additionally much of Descartes thought regarding the indivisibility of the mind is based on a preceding conception of the mind as non-physical before the argument proves
‘Will I survive?’, ‘Am I the same person?’, ‘Will there be some person alive who is the same person as me?’ (Parfit, 1971, p.9) these are all questions that must be answered in order to determine ones survival or future responsible actions. Parfit, however, argues that these beliefs are false or mistaken as such. He has three fundamental arguments; 1. He rejects both the physical and soul theories of the self. 2.
Another weakness is the idea that Descartes only knows of his existence through his thinking. Everything is in the present tense meaning he is unable to make any predictions or thoughts on the past or the future. He makes thought the only characteristic in true existence which some see as a very broad assumption. Some philosophers rejected the necessity of thought to prove existence as they believed that when they turned the sentence ‘I think therefore I am’ to the reverse ‘I do not think therefore I am not’ they believed this to be untrue. An example of a rock was used to show that the rock may not be thinking however can still be in
The issue of circularity with the syllogistic view no longer applies because it no longer makes sense: if a point is self-evident there is no room for circularity. If the Cogito is self-evident, then there cannot possibly be circularity. Likewise, if the Cogito is self-evident, then the objection I raised regarding the reliability of logic itself does not hold, as no logic is needed to arrive at something that is self-evident. Therefore the Cogito, if it is self-evident, is sound. As a result, the Cogito as a self-evident fact and intuition successfully defeats the strongest skeptical point that we cannot even know if we exist, and Descartes conclusion of the Cogito
As Descartes asserts, this allows the body “to imitate all those of our functions”. Notice, in this passage Descartes fails to provide a description of the soul (the mind). This means, however, that the soul does not take part for this mechanistic actions, and these may take place without the soul/mind; these actions, however, would be repetitive and would have no
Plato, however, disagrees. He states that not only is priori knowledge the true type of knowledge, but that posteriori knowledge is just a false opinion. This is because our senses are what are unreliable as knowledge can only be obtain through the
Churchland assumes that people’s common-sense framework would be eliminated over time as it gives a misleading insight of human behaviors, cognitive abilities, and the nature of reality at large. The matter is that the eliminative materialist perspective is built according to a strong conviction that folk psychology is a “hopelessly primitive and deeply confused conception of our internal activities” (Churchland pg. 288). The main argument for eliminative materialism suggested by Churchland is the fact that folk psychology has proved unable to explain the fundamental materiality of the human essence, including the nature of learning, memory, and mental
A person's being must have little as possible to do with the body as it tries to grasp wisdom or knowledge of reality. Therefore, since the body cannot perceive the Forms through eyes, ears or any bodily sense, one must try to perceive through the mind. From this one must conclude that, so long as we are in our bodies and the soul is mixed with evil, our desire for the truth will not be
Yet, the constructivist view of Kantian ethics may present a contradiction: if morality is entirely constructed by human rationality, then there should not be a universal principle which one would need “to receive” in order to regulate decisions. Thus, as Kant rejects authority and experience, through reason and textual analysis, drawing both from Kant’s writing and Augustine’s City of God, it is imperative to reconcile the conflict between the realist—that morality exists independent of rationality—and constructivist readings of Kant’s ethics. That “in practical common reason, when it cultivates itself, a dialectic inadvertently unfolds [...] and one is therefore [unable] to find rest anywhere but in a complete critique of our reason” lends credence a constructivist
Nietzsche maintains that: Firstly, free will and unfree will does not exist and an actor does not act out of free will. This allures that the actor is not the cause of an action. Secondly, causality is misused to organize the chaos of life in something comprehendible to human subjectivity. Cause and effect is not objective ordering of events. Cause and effect is used out of fear of the foreign.