Therefore, how do we know then what God approves or disapproves of? Divine command theory is the idea that certain actions are morally good or morally bad because they are what God wills for us. God’s demands determine what is right or wrong. What he tells us to do is right, and what he tells us not to do is wrong. This theory states that the only thing that makes an
He believed since god is all knowing (of past, present, and future), than there is nothing to surprise him. That is especially true when considering action, and in this case choosing between options when approaching an ethical dilemma. This idea of forfeiting free will to rely on God’s infinite wisdom doesn’t sit well with me. I, personally, like to believe that there is a right or wrong answer. Even when the choices don’t necessarily present “right” versus “wrong”.
The Divine Command Theory The Divine Command Theory is an ethical theory that states that God decides what is morally right and what is morally wrong. The theory argues that to be morally good one must do what God says and abstain from doing what God forbids. The question that is going to be discussed in this essay is if The Divine Command Theory provides an acceptable account of what makes an action morally right and others morally wrong. In this essay I will argue against the previously mentioned statement using the following arguments: The inconsistency between theists, the dependence of morality on religion and finally, Euthyphro’s dilemma. One problem with the Divine Command Theory is that it assumes that all its followers agree on what
Euthyphro, the argument, gives two alternatives to the divine command theory that either morally good acts are willed by God because they are morally good, or morally good acts are morally good because they are willed by God. Further he explained that neither alternative is true and therefore the Divine command theory is false. So is Plato suggesting that there is no such thing as a definition of holiness, that there is no one feature that all holy deeds have in
There is something in this idea that can be applied to morality. Some actions, like journeys, have value regardless of the outcomes they produce. Williams brings this point about to show how the utilitarian’s focus on consequences might not be the best way to assign value to actions, since it has no way of accounting for the intrinsic values actions may have. Here I have to agree with Williams. The manner in which consequentialist judge actions does not seem to allow any room for considering a person’s intent behind choosing to commit that act.
One traditional moral problem regards the moral permissibility of self-harm, the ultimate case of which is suicide. Spinoza does not agree with most of the traditional religious reasons for treating suicide as a sin. God simply does not issue commandments in the way that a king issues commandments. Given this fact, Spinoza thinks, it makes little sense to try to explain moral claims like “Suicide is a sin” by appeal to such commandments. Although he disagrees with traditional reasons for taking suicide to be immoral, he nevertheless agrees that suicide is in fact immoral.
Kant argued that it was Hume's philosophy, flinched from the "dogmatism". However, in the changed context and something unlike Hume, Kant had just sense a source of moral norms. The changed context consisted in the fact that Kant does not ask how to justify all value judgments in the same way, rather than separately dealing with the so-called morality in the narrow sense, that is, the attitudes on which it is possible to agree all and make them subject to an obligation or duty and other value judgments in which it sets the request. This difference, which extends along ethic is well understood. You can consider that a good deal of long
Kant offers that his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals “is nothing more than the identification and corroboration of the supreme principle of morality” (4:392). He maintains that people must use “practical philosophy”, or careful reasoning, in order to delineate the precise principle of human morality, which Kant later identifies and formulates as the categorical imperative. To understand this supreme principle of morality, Kant asserts the truth in two things: there exists morality, which regulates human behaviors and signifies good actions, and that this morality can be only understood through reason. Assuming that these are both true, it is not entirely clear what the ontological relationship is between human rationality and morality—whether
Descartes most famous phrase “I think, therefore I am” shows that we cannot be deceived of our own existence as we cannot think if we exist if we do not in fact exist. Descartes’ second part of the hypothesis for the Evil Demon argument refutes the idea of there being such a being with the assumption of a God. With the assumption of a God who is merciful and kind the chance of an evil being deceiving and tricking us would be highly unlikely to happen. Therefore, we can be very sure that we are not being deceived by an evil demon, only for those who believe in God. Other people who do not would rather not believe in the existence of God than believe the uncertainty of everything else (Descartes first mediation, page 202).
If the first is culled, it would implicatively insinuate that whatever God commands must be good: even if he commanded someone to inflict suffering, then inflicting suffering must be moral. If the latter is culled, then morality is no longer dependent on God, vanquishing the divine command theory. Also, if God is subject to an external law, he is not sovereign or omnipotent, which would challenge the orthodox conception of God. Proponents of the Euthyphro dilemma might claim that divine command theory is conspicuously erroneous because either answer challenges the competency of God to give moral