Dworkin believes that judges do not have discretion. This is a counter position to my argument that judges do have judicial discretion. Firstly, we need to look at what Dworkin and positivists mean by discretion. Dworkin distinguishes between ‘weak’ discretion and ‘strong’ discretion. The ordinary usage of the term ‘discretion’ refers to ‘weak’ discretion.
The lawyer can act morally by giving up on a case because he knows for a fact that murder is immoral. We also know that ethics is something that is imposed by the society, meaning subjective and particular. These are standards of what to do and what we should not do. The lawyer can act ethically by doing his job and defend his client. With the help of this analogy, we can say that we act morally if we stand on something that what we think is morally right regardless of the situation.
Ronald Dworkin: Taking Rights Seriously Ronald Dworkin, a philosopher, jurist, and a scholar of the United States Constitutional Law was most known for his theory of law and his input on how the law should deal with controversial issues. To many he is believed to be the most important legal philosopher of our time. His beliefs are that people that believe there are moral rights, in the strong sense, should believe that their government should bear with breaking in cases that clash with rights. A strong sense is claims and rights, while a weak sense is privileges and liberties. In the beginning of Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin enforces that his main idea is to interpret and defend a liberal theory of law based on individual rights.
could also be morally right if He commands it (Wainright, 2005). That is, how do we govern the interpretation of sacred text and which sacred text is the correct one. When He states that an action is immoral is it always as such or is there any specific context that make it immoral, it is in this method of interpretation that we begin to exercise our own intuition of morality (Wierenga,
In his essay The Model of Rules I, Professor Ronald Dworkin argues against a certain theory of law he attributes to H.L.A Hart called “positivism.” While Dworkin argues against many tenets of the positivist theory, I will focus this essay on critical reasons against Dworkin’s argument against the legal positivist thesis that the law consist of nothing but rules. To do so, I will explain the necessary components of Hart’s theory of law required to understand Dworkin’s rebuttal. Then, I will reconstruct Dworkin’s argument against what I will classify “nothing but rules” claim, and I will ultimate claim Dworkin’s argument fails because his premise that states principles are extra-legal and cannot be explained as part of the categories is false. In particular, I indicate how principles can be legally binding like legal rules are, and I pick apart his reasons for believing that there are clear distinctions between laws and principles.I will interpret the cases Dworkin uses to support his thesis to show the limitations of his argument. Finally, woven within the points I stated above, I will be sure to anticipate potential counterarguments and weigh them against my thesis.
This is not to say that judges do not operate under the legal boundaries as set by the constitution, but some have argued that since the discretionary powers of judges and Supreme Court judges, in this case, can significantly affect the outcome of any judicial decision, then their ideology and personal philosophy is quite important especially when they would be voting on significant cases. Finally, both sides of the divide recognize the importance, and role ideology plays in the major legal decisions. Ideology matters and a person’s thinking is bound to influence the way they will vote on important issues, and this is why interest groups on both sides of the ideological divide have strong reasons for making judicial confirmation a high priority because they know what is at stake in who occupies the federal bench. Lawrence H. Tribe. God Save This Honourable Court, 87, 90 – 91 (1985).
This criticism has as its main target Korsgaard's argument for humanity. Just like the criticims of Korsgaard's constructivism, Tenenbaum and FitzPatrick believe that morality in Korsgaard's theory is based upon something that the individual agent does. The difference is that they argue that even if the individual agent chooses to reason in the way that Korsgaard wants him to reason, this way of reasoning is flawed. Here I will shortly discuss their argument to show that it is based upon the interpretation of the self as the source of normativity that I am
The basis of all three is preventing an individual to harm others and I believe that sufficiently justifies laws. I also believe that Dworkin is correct in widening the justification of laws to include an individual’s harm or benefit to themselves.Thaler and Sunstein’s idea of nudging people to make beneficial decisions, I believe, is also correct. Any
Don Marquis establishes a philosophical argument for his view that abortion is morally impermissible in his journal, “Why Abortion is Immoral”. In this paper, I will argue that Marquis’ argument is unsound by showing that some of his supporting premises are false and that by correcting them, the argument becomes invalid because the conclusion no longer logically follows the premises. I will start off by outlining Marquis’ argument against abortion. In his first premise, he states that “Killing me (or you, reader) is prima facia seriously wrong” (Marquis 190). His second premise is “For any killing where the victim did have a valuable future like ours, having that future itself is sufficient to create the strong presumption that killing is seriously wrong” (Marquis 195).
The judge didn’t even use his gavel and didn’t raise his voice the slightest. On those Sunday mornings when you’re watching Judge Judy, you believe that she is there to figure out the conflict and what is right and, but for the most part, it seems like she uses her own opinions of two parties to come to a decision on the case. If the defendant argued with her too much, she would rule in favor of the plaintiff. Going to a real courtroom and seeing how Judge Freeman interacts with his parties in the case proved all of my previous understanding of how judges act