The Emptiness Charge in Kant’s Moral Philosophy Introduction: The Emptiness Charge in Kant’s Moral Philosophy Chapter One: The Formalistic Expressions in Kant’s Writings 1.1. The Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals- The Equivalence Thesis 1.2. The Critique of Practical Reason- The Universal Will Chapter Two: Kant’s Formalism and Its Emptiness Charge 2.1. Hegel’s Empty Formalism Objection 2.1.1. A Restatement of Categorical Imperative 2.1.2. The Limited Interpretation of Hegel’s Emptiness Charge 2.1
Introduction: Kant’s Categorical Imperative and the Emptiness Charge in Kant’s Moral Philosophy Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is mostly remembered for its central thesis, the Categorical Imperative (CI). According to Kant, rational beings experience the moral law as a Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative commands universally and unconditionally, from which all duties are derived. Kant articulates the Categorical Imperative through several formulations. The most prominent formulations
not understand it, but we know it as the condition of the moral law which we do know ( KpV 3-4). With a completely different strategy in the First Critique where freedom was explicated in order to confirm the possibility of morality, Kant reverses this doctrine by noting that the moral law is the grounding of the possibility of transcendental freedom. Kant reverses the doctrine of the First Critique, i.e., freedom
Before Kant, moral philosophy was dominated by Crusius’s sense of divine morality which stipulates that the will of a person has to be in accordance with the will of God. Wolff’s notion of moral perfection adds that we should strive to procedurally achieve our sense of moral obligation to the degree that the ends or effects of a particular action are based on our ability to calculate perfection. Kant concludes that Wolff’s postulates are virtually impossible in attempting perfection in 1764 in his
outlook.’’ He critiques Kant’s thought by observing ‘‘every action explicitly calls for a particular content and a specific end, while duty as abstraction entails nothing of the kind.’’ (Hegel Philosophy of Right 134) Hegel contends that the only way Kant can possibly deduce a particular duty is if Kant already accepted certain existing moral opinions or customs as justifiable. For example, it is certainly a contradictory maxim to accept a deposit that is entrusted to me without planning to return
resolution of the problems arising from the versions of the emptiness charge mostly by reconsidering them in a non-formal sense. As we have seen, the broad emptiness charge is an adaptation of the traditional emptiness charge. This charge claims that the most distinctive and important feature in Kant’s ethics is not his claims about the particular ethical duties that we owe to each other, but his views about the nature of value. In other words, moral action wholly exists deep inside of me rather than elsewhere
we neglect our own perfection. While there are additional duties that make us better moral persons, it is difficult to analyze them under C1 or C2 because of the uniqueness of these duties which focus on improving our capacity to act dutifully. Given that there are no duties to self derivable from C1 alone in the Doctrines of Virtues, when we turn to a discussion of duties to others we face even more complications. All the duties of love (and likewise benevolence) are loosely derived from C1. While
evidences that imply value realism in Kant’s moral philosophy. However, a number of doubts remain whether Kant endorsed realism or value realism. There have been lots of scholars working on these issues. Kantian value realism, I think most famously Alison Hill’ Kantian value realism, has been widely discussed for different purposes. Alison Hill in the article Kantian value realism, evaluates Korsgaard and Wood’s explanation of the construction of moral and non-moral value as a ‘regress’ argument (Korsgaard
identify moral law. According to Hill, aside from Korsgarrd’s objection to realism, there are mainly two doubts whether Kant implies value realism. The first doubt arises from epistemological concerns. Kant states that it is possible for all of us to possess moral knowledge; given that we construct value it is clearly plausible that we can know what is valuable. However, if value realism is correct, then our epistemic access to value is much more puzzling. In Hill’s view, Kant does find moral knowledge
Mill’s Utilitarianism. I would only focus on Mill’s charge of Kant’s moral law. Because it might be superfluous for my purpose to discuss Mill’s utilitarianism on its own accord, much like discussing Hegel’s own philosophy in the earlier section. 2.2.1 Mill’s Utilitarianism Mill 's critique of Kant derives from the philosophical perspective of Utilitarianism. In the Introduction of his book, Utilitarianism, Mill remarks that it is rare that moral thinkers do not provide a list of a priori principles