Ethical Objectivity, And The Gods In Plato's Euthyphro

Piety, Ethical Objectivity, and The Gods in Plato’s Euthyphro

Plato’s Euthyphro presents an unorthodox argument for the nature of ethical objectivity, where Socrates queries Euthyphro on whether the pious is god-loved because it is pious, or because it is god-loved (Plato Euthyphro 10a1-2). This argument is referred to as the “Euthyphro Dilemma,” and has beckoned many philosophers to consider the nature of ethical objectivity in relation to (the) god(s), and as a whole. This paper will argue that while Socrates’ argument directly relies on the gods in the Euthyphro due to the semantic nature of the term “piety,” the crux of the argument can hold true and be applied to addressing ethical objectivity through what Kenneth Walden classifies

If piety were to be synonymous with goodness, that would negate what Katja Vogt describes as a “two-directional relational property” between the gods and humans, where human perspectives towards what the gods deem to be moral/immoral, good/bad, etc. and what the gods actually perceive to have such qualities comprises the pious- whatever “the pious” objectively may be. This relationship is critical to differentiating piety from other “good” qualities, as other preliminary elements are relied upon for someone/something to be considered pious. In other words, the gods champion certain things/qualities (e.g. good, just, noble, etc.), which by extension of already possessing those traits, are deemed pious. Something being pious relies on other virtues, so being god-loved is a necessary but insufficient condition to denote objective piety. Consequently, the nature of piety as a trait is reliant on the

Walden’s Euthyphro Subjective is defined as something obtaining a given quality because of the “activities, attitudes, and willings of some class of individuals,” whereas the Euthyphro Objective denotes something that possesses said property independently from the subjective experiences of some class of individuals. As Socrates outlines in 10b7-10c6, there are various examples in which piety can be replaced with other verbs (e.g. carried, led, affected), which further substantiate the ultimate point of the Euthyphro Dilemma: to consider what the objective form of a given quality is. By extension of this, Vogt argues that Socrates’ point calls into question whether or not objective forms of certain ethical virtues can exist at all, gods aside. This directly correlates with Plato’s theory of Forms, in which he states that Forms possess certain relevant properties, which must be explained. While the Euthyphro provides no direct answer to the dilemma, it does make a case for some “form” of piety (or another virtue, for that matter) to exist in an objective. In response, Socrates seems to suggest that something cannot be perceived (whether by the gods, or in general) into existence, rather, it simply exists (Plato Euthyphro