Good and Evil Are not Real The concept of good and evil is one of the most foundational apothegms ever known to humankind. It was a crucial stepping stone for other morals, and it is what averts society from pandemonium, by providing structures for laws. But, one may ask oneself; where did the conceptualization of good and evil arise? I believe that good and evil does not exist and are entirely artificial. Ludicrous is what one might be thinking after I’ve stated such a radical exposition, but I disagree and can justify my argument with factual evidence.
In this essay, I will show that Immanuel Kant is wrong to think that the only good without limitation is the good will. My first step in defending this thesis will be to review Kant’s argument about how the good will is intrinsically good. I will then try to undermine his view by showing it supports implausible claims. For example, the premise of Kant’s claim is that good will is unconditioned. However, the good will may depend on outside factors to bring about good in a person.
And yet, the science and reason that brought us this invention are not enough to force humanity to accept it in all facets of life. Something potentially responsible for this phenomenon is the Backfire Effect. David McRaney describes the Backfire Effect with great accuracy in his article “The Backfire Effect”: “coming or going, you stick to your beliefs instead of questioning them. When someone tries to correct you, tries to dilute your misconceptions, it backfires and strengthens them instead” (1). This unbreakable resolve for maintaining beliefs in contradiction to logic prevents us from seeing truth effectively.
The fact of the matter is yes, we can imagine such a device but yet, we do not have it. Why would God have it? We humans do a lot of things that are not completely ethical particularly when a lot of people is involved in the situation and yet end up choosing the most moral under the circumstances but not necessarily the most ethical because that is how we have agreed to live our lives. Licon says “The freewill defense cannot explain why God didn’t take such basic preemptive measures” referring to the device and the freewill defense does explain it, just as it explains why such device is nonexistent. His conclusions lack good support: “Freewill defense places too much weight on freedom, and not enough weight on the lives and wellbeing of innocents” (4) Wrong, freedom is and it is absolute.
For speculative reason, the concept of freedom was problematic, but not impossible. That is to say, speculative reason could think of freedom without contradiction, but it could not assure any objective reality to it…Freedom, however, among all the ideas of speculative reason is the only one whose possibility we know a priori. We do not understand it, but we know it as the condition of the moral law which we do know ( KpV3-4). With a completely different strategy in the First Critique where freedom was explicated in order to confirm the possibility of morality, Kant reverses this doctrine by noting that the moral law is the grounding of the possibility of transcendental freedom. Kant reverses the doctrine of the First Critique, i.e., freedom is possible only under the conceivability of acting in accordance with moral law when he writes: For had not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we would never have been justified in assuming anything like freedom…But if there were no freedom, the moral law would never have been encountered in us ( KpV4
Arguably, Benedict had a free choice whether to accept the risk or not. However, the defence of ‘volenti’ would be hard to prove because debatably Benedict was unaware of the risk and so, could not have consented to it as Jenifer’s statement created a ‘false sense of safety’. There is also the defence of contributory negligence which will reduce compensation payable. This arises where the claimant causes or contributes to their own harm by failing to take reasonable care for their own safety. This is assessed by asking what the reasonable person in the circumstances of the claimant would have done to avoid injury.
However, there is one common thing that Wilson shares with Kant and that thing is free will. Generally, free will is a process in our mind that exist despite circumstances and changes in the environment. Some scientists believe that there is no such thing as free will; and describe free will as a random event which occurs in our brain. However, there is at least one counter-argument against it which is human tendency to take responsibility for what he does and going beyond other expectations. Moreover, human beings cannot predict the future and know whether their actions are right or wrong.
Questions of morality are abstract and extremely touchy. They are subject to enduring debates regarding its origins, nature, and limits, with no possibility of a consensus. Although the theories on morality often pursue diverse angles, among the most interesting ones that have come up in recent times revolve around the question whether human beings are born with an innate moral sense. Some scholars hold the view that humans are born with an inherent sense of morality while others believe the opposite that humans are not born with an innate moral sense holds true. By using Steven Pinker’s The Blank Slate and Paul Bloom’s Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil, this essay will analyze the opinions advanced by both sides of the theories.
In this context, it means that not only will the theory be unable to expect or explain such cognitive errors, it might also be incapable to describe the intentional states of a person executing these mistakes (Stich as cited in Funkhouser, n.d.). Since there is no guarantee that human beings are rational agents at all time, Dennett’s intentional system theory is false as the theory is only valid when the intentional stance has been adopted towards an entity in which we believe that after adopting the following theory, we’re only able to foretell and define its behaviour by giving treatment to it as though it were a rational agent with activities are administered by its views and needs (Kind,
Carey introduces that “[p]erhaps free will belief encourages a stricter form of universal morality” (139). Without free will, “there can be no sense of moral responsibility” (Carey 135). Free will, therefore moral responsibility as well, would result in the Nietzsche's claim that free will was implemented for the “purpose of punishment” (Nietzsche 355), which will also “impute guilt” (Nietzsche 355). In Careys study, it was found that “free will believers call for harsher criminal punishment” (Carey 135-136). Free will can influence universal morality.
In states of emergence the ideas are there but the logic isn 't and that is what you get from this story. Not that it 's not true, but that it’s not organized linearly, which in fact may be more true than a story that was crafted in an organized fashion. When people tell stories they edit and spice to give the reader or listener a clean line of events. But life is not clean and orderly it is a mas confusion and chaotic mess. Therefore, the non-linear line here may in fact be more true than the “truth.” a war story should not be told neatly because it probably didnt fashion out that way.
When Rudolf Hess stated that he was actually prepared to do so, this right was ignored (McKeown 34). When Hess stated that he was prepared to act as his own counsel, this right was ignored. In denying Hess this right, the court argued they were doing him a favor. Hess was exhibiting signs of amnesia and insanity, and any effort made to argue his own case would likely have been compromised and unproductive. However, the opportunity to argue one 's own case is inherent in the right to counsel.