Variations in Tactics. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers (Sun Tzu, Art of War). Since 2002, the United States counterinsurgency strategy has shown that it has a heavy credence resembling Clausewitz–esk strategy. Using this type of battle stratagem emphasizes using superior western technology, doctrine fixated on lethal operations, and a misrepresented western view on jus ad bellum (just cause for war). The war in Afghanistan has largely been one fail after another due in part to the generals who following the teachings of 19th century German military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz who advocates for the use of superior
On July 30, 2008, a bloody battle involving Coalition forces took place in the mountainous eastern Afghan province of Nuristan. This was the Battle of Wanat and the devastating amount of Coalition casualties began a vigorous investigation by the United States Army. The village of Wanat, defended by Second Platoon, Chosen Company, Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team would fall victim to numerous bad decision made by higher command. Although the men of Chosen Company fought hard, they ended up surrounded, vastly outnumbered, and without any Battalion assets. This paper will argue the reasons for the disastrous outcome of the Battle of Wanat; examining the effective company leadership exploiting effective
currently down which is something that can be used very effectively in the art of war. In World War One we used this tactic again by entering the war when the enemy was already being threatened and attacked. By applying the lessons used in past wars, it allowed us to successfully navigate through future conflicts and battles. Question Two-
With this morality in both conflicts plays a role in the bombing of cities and villages that contained a high concentration of civilians, where the United States believed the enemy to be stationed. It is here where the concept of body counts comes into play and supports the argument of an unjust, immoral war that defied the concepts held by American Exceptionalism. Tirman uses the example of Vietnam to point out argument, where the bombing strategy of “harassment and interdiction fire” was practiced, where there was no proof that enemy targets were destroyed and in the end did more harm than good as “killed a lot of innocents” to produce a number of supposed enemy casualties” (Tirman, The Real Cost of Vietnam). As in Vietnam the excessive bombings
Abrams also stressed a “one war” concept that put equal emphasis on military operations, improvement of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and pacification – all of which are codependent so that the better we do in one, the more our chance of progress in others (18). The changes in tactics under Abrams, and in the concept of the nature of the war, and even the enemy reaction to battlefield reserves, by no means meant an end to fierce combat, or even to large-scale military operations (138). America’s principal national objective became peace. Abrams policy proved to be better than the policy of attrition. The policy of attrition simply meant, under those circumstances, a very prolonged type of warfare, whereas the U.S. can clear and hold, and keep an area secure, and keep the enemy out.
The American Revolution arose from the escalating conflict between the thirteen colonies and their mother country, Great Britain. This uprising took place between 1775 and 1783. By the end of the war, the thirteen colonies, in victory, had gained their independence from Britain and were to be called the United States of America. Some argue that the increasing debt of the British Empire, aided the Americans’ win in the Revolutionary war the most. However the different battle tactics used by the colonial militia and intervention of other countries like France played a role on a much larger scale in the result of America’s victory.
When president Obama made a speech at West Point talking about America was force to fight war in Afghanistan. As he spoke, it felt like he was speaking through Machiavelli point of view. He spoke about maintaining power which Machiavelli emphasizes on. President Obama strategies were for his people to fear him but not to be hated. He had changed something in the mission, I which he sent more troops to Afghanistan to try to keep peace.
It is vital that the military uses history to their advantage, whether it is good or bad, in
The art of war passed through a fundamental transformation, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries. Changes involved all aspects of warfare, strategy, operations, logistics and tactics. That period saw unprecedented economic, social, and political change. Therefore, the manner in which a given society wages war is the typical product of the whole societal, political, and economic system for that society. While the economic, societal and politic order that characterized the period between the religion wars and the French revolution had limited warfare; mass politics, nationalism and the industrial revolution which marked the era of the French revolution and the U.S. Civil War remade warfare from its strategic, operational, logistic
Some Experts’ Opinions You might see him on Fox news or maybe shouting in a courtroom, the adjunct professor from Georgetown, Dr. Michael Sheuer, or simply, “Mike”, has major concerns about the way American’s foreign policy has been handled in recent years. The choice isn 't between war and peace. It is between war and endless war , in this age of warfare, the purpose of conflicts that our leaders drag us into, become uncertain as the deaths multiply. Mike has a valid point. During his career running operations in the CIA, the Bin Laden case is a standout, so it is important that people of opposing views at least take a minute to consider his steady, keen outcry against the way American leaders deal with foreign allies.
The Americans fought against the North Vietnamese socialists as if performing the attrition based game of chess. Moderately, the Vietnamese hired guerrilla strategies counter to a greater opponent, similar to Sun Tzu they did not take on American militaries directly and somewhat condemned them at weakened areas. As the game of Go they governed a huge region with smaller powers. I believe that this short case study on Sun Tzu's use of the game of Go in his application of strategy positively demonstrates that the prosperous statesmen and generals elude wars of erosion in search of their
The CJCS also outlines and writes the National Military Strategy provided to Combatant Commanders as military context and translation of the National Defense
Book Review 2: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises by Richard Betts Summary: Betts starts off his book by recognizing the ambiguity around the advocacy of the use of force in a crisis by military leaders even though there is a prevalent assumption that military professionals are more aggressive than diplomats and politicians. He states he writes the book in order to provide a comprehensive survey of the postwar role of American military men in decisions on their most essential function, their use of force in combat. Betts acknowledges the vast availability of literature on military participation in decisions on defense budgets and weapons procurement, but feels there is a void when looking at decision-making from the perspective of military leadership versus civilian leadership.
According to Clausewitz, military commanders must first be aware of the three most important strategic objectives of war: (1) to conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy; (2) to take possession of his material and other sources of strength, and (3) to gain public opinion.1 To attain the strategic objectives, Clausewitz requires the application of three decisive military principles: military commanders must apply unrelenting pressure and energy to defeat the enemy; military commanders must mass combat power against the enemy’s vulnerability, creating or revealing additional weaknesses that the attacking force can exploit; and commanders must capitalize on speed, surprise, and shock to destroy the enemy. Clausewitz insists that
Bush administration, and part 1 of this book spans that period. Parts 2 through 4 cover the Obama years. That wider scope, subsuming two quite different administrations, only serves to under-score the profound impact of philosophic ideas in foreign policy, regardless of who sits in the Oval Office. You will also learn that victory is achievable—if we take certain necessary steps (a detailed account can be found in Winning the Unwinnable War). Part 5 sketches out how an Objectivist approach to foreign policy stands apart in today’s intellectual landscape.
Introduction In Chapter 1, Sun Tzu has started his guidance from a brief introduction. He states it is the most importance significance of war planning ought to be "completely considered," that its result implies the distinction amongst survival and destroy of the country. Besides, he also discusses about the way of war planning. From this planning, the three aspects are including which are two sides’ situation, winning condition and the ability of leader.