External Incentives Model Analysis

3.1.1. External Incentives Model
The first model to explain Europeanization in accession countries is based on rationalist mode of bargaining which follows the logic of consequences (Goetz/Hix 2000: 10-13). Intergovernmental bargaining starts with the misfit between the EU and domestic status-quo. The EU is the principle actor since it sets necessary conditions to start, continue and finalize the accession process. This means conditionality lies at the heart of this model. Compliance or non-compliance is an outcome of the negotiation process in which rational actors exchange information and make cost-benefit calculations to make instrumental preferences. The process is asymmetrical since the EU sets the rules to be adopted and also because

Socialization is another mechanism leading to persuasion and eventual compliance. In contrast with the rationalist external incentives model, social learning model is the constructivist alternative to explain actors’ compliance with the EU (Checkel 2001). The model suggests that Europeanization is an EU-driven process in which actors follow the logic of appropriateness and make decisions in accordance to their socially constructed identity and interests. In other words, an actor is most likely to comply with the EU rules in case it is convinced by the legitimacy of these rules and practices. Strong identification with the EU’s norms and values adds up to the legitimacy. In addition to that, domestic resonance with the EU rules and procedures increase the level of social acceptance for compliance as well (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005: 18-20). In short, an actor complies with the EU rules and norms as a result of persuasion of its appropriateness rather than rationalist cost-benefit calculations on the expected

According to this model, domestic governments are the principle actors who make decisions to transfer EU rules as a result of lesson-drawing. The analytical point of departure might be ineffectiveness or diminishing legitimacy of domestic rules and procedures. The most definitive feature of the model is the presence of domestic dissatisfaction with the status quo (Rose 1991: 10-12). Another key aspect of the model is the voluntary form of compliance in contrast with compulsory rule adoption comes with conditionality. The principle actor evaluates the external alternatives and makes the choice which serves its own quests. This kind of compliance does not necessarily come as a complete package deal but might also be selective. There are different degrees such as emulation by adopting the ideas and adjusting them according to domestic needs, combination of several different policies and inspiration (Dolowitz/Mash 2000: