Failed State Theory

2.3 Theoretical Foundations

All things considered, the Failed State Theory is the underpinning theory upon which the proposed conceptual framework in this study was built. Since the demise of the Cold War in 1989, there has been widespread optimism about the prospects of African countries. However, instead of growth and democracy, a growing number of states have experienced severe crises and state failure has become a dominant feature in several regions, including parts of the former Soviet Union, Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Eriksen 2005). In view of these developments, it is scarcely surprising that the discourse on state failure has become a popular catchword in leading academic circles (Herbst 1996-97; Zartman 1995; Milliken 2005;

According to Minh Nguyen (2005) in an article entitled, “The question of failed states” the causes for state failure in the Third world are many including historical factors, internal and external factors. Likewise, Williams (2007), observes that the extant literature on the subject of state failure highlight two relevant distinctions. The first distinction is between states that fail because of a lack of relevant capacities and those that fail to promote the interests of all their citizens through political choice, often with the intention of benefiting the ruling elite and its supporters (Williams 2007). As such the dynamics in this case are somewhat different from instances where a regime may well want to restore order to part of its territory but lacks the relevant capacities. A second distinction points to the differences between structural and contingent causes of state failure. In the structural category three main arguments are commonly put forward. Firstly, the Westphalian ideal of statehood has not successfully taken root across all of Africa because of inhospitable local conditions to state building. A second structural argument centres on the problems posed by political geography especially resources. The third argument revolves around the concept of the security dilemma in which certain actors hasten state collapse in fear of an ungoverned future

Carment, argues that many states have failed or will continue to fail largely because the support they received from one or both of the superpowers as proxy allies during the Cold War dried up after the fall of the Berlin wall. In his article, “Assessing state failure : Implications for theory and policy”, Carment (2003) develops three perspectives that explain the causes of state failure. The first perspective associates state failure with macro-level changes in the international system. It is argued that changes in the international system structure can reverse state building. He goes on to say that the international economic context began to tilt against existing African state structures in the 1980s with the emergence of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The situation was compounded by the end of the Cold War which precipitated a much more hostile international context for state formation. The second stressed intermediate state-society relations and the third emphasizes micro-level strategic interactions between groups. It appears Garment analysis on state failure in Africa is premised on systemic analysis. Clearly, this approach is highly restrictive and ignores other important non-systemic variables. In much the same way, Ayoob (1995) points out that state failure is largely a function of the withdrawal of outside support to weak states. The net result, as Ayoob shows is the absence of effective statehood in much of