Arguments Against Foundationalism

Fallacy • Fallacies are defects in an argument. • Fallacies cause an argument to be invalid, unsound, or weak. Formal Fallacies • Identified through discrepancies in syllogistic patterns and terms. • Only found in deductive arguments. • For a deductive argument to be valid, it must be absolutely impossible for both its premises to be true and its conclusion to be false.

There is something in this idea that can be applied to morality. Some actions, like journeys, have value regardless of the outcomes they produce. Williams brings this point about to show how the utilitarian’s focus on consequences might not be the best way to assign value to actions, since it has no way of accounting for the intrinsic values actions may have. Here I have to agree with Williams. The manner in which consequentialist judge actions does not seem to allow any room for considering a person’s intent behind choosing to commit that act.

Mackie’s argument from queerness is founded upon a naturalistic account of the world. The main idea of the argument from queerness seems to imply that we should not believe in the existence of objective values because they would not fit in with a naturalistic world. He is convinced that there are no moral facts and properties, and we cannot possibly have moral knowledge. There are two parts in Mackie’s argument from queerness, one metaphysical and the other epistemological. The metaphysical component

Individuals with neuroticism personality are pre-occupied, reluctant and incompetent in taking initiatives that are why they avoid decision making. Lack of self-efficacy and stress is positively related avoidant decision-making style. Avoidance in leadership, decision-making, and conflict management is considered inappropriate (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Thunholm(2008) shows that stress-laden individuals with neuroticism are avoidant decision makers. Individuals with neuroticism personality types are pre-occupied, reluctant and incompetent in taking initiatives that are why they avoid decision making and conflict management (McCrae & Costa, 1990).

Churchland assumes that people’s common-sense framework would be eliminated over time as it gives a misleading insight of human behaviors, cognitive abilities, and the nature of reality at large. The matter is that the eliminative materialist perspective is built according to a strong conviction that folk psychology is a “hopelessly primitive and deeply confused conception of our internal activities” (Churchland pg. 288). The main argument for eliminative materialism suggested by Churchland is the fact that folk psychology has proved unable to explain the fundamental materiality of the human essence, including the nature of learning, memory, and mental

In Response to McGrath’s Dilemma Against Moral Inferentialism An influential argument for moral skepticism is the moral regress argument (Sayre-McCord 1996). Moral inferentialists, who think we do have genuine moral knowledge, argue against the moral regress argument by rejecting the picture of justification one finds in the moral regress argument. Sarah McGrath (2004), in order to make room for her non-inferential moral perception account of moral knowledge, presents a dilemma against moral inferentialism, the thesis that all of our moral knowledge of particular cases is inferential. In particular, she challenges the most compelling version of moral inferentialism, which I call moral bridge inferentialism. In this paper, I argue that both horns of McGrath’s apparent dilemma turn out to lack argumentative weight against the moral bridge inferentialist.

One of the objections which I consider to be of strength is one regarding the over flexibility of the sanction principle. The in-built nature of utilitarianism as a theory, fails to impose plausible corrective consequences to those actions which do not comply with the stipulated rules of the moral theory. Though the theory claims to not promote actions of self benefit, it fails to blatantly rebuke actions contravening general morality, by offering acceptance to such given that the justification provided corresponds with the guidelines of the theory. This objection is of collorally effect to a line of criticisms. Bernard Williams presents a reasonable flaw of the theory not being able to uphold justice and fairness.

Husserl uses this reasonable claim by rejecting it in his phenomenology by showing us that the existence of the external world which exists beyond our knowledge and beliefs about it is doubtful, as the external world for a realist would still exist if even if there was no one to experience it, Husserl 's points out that there are little characteristics of realism that inform us on which entities belong to the real world. This puts Descartes in a position of vulnerability in Husserl 's phenomenology as it allows Husserl to point out Descartes failures and inconsistency within his method. When observing Descartes philosophy we are able to see his perspective, high influence and position within the study of Husserl 's phenomenology, his standing in this philosophy is of great importance as it bases the origination of most of Husserl 's

Another way to look at the parable interpretation would be not to think of it as a Buddhist distaste of discourse, rationale, and logic. Instead one should consider the undesirable role of personal identity or the ‘self’ when philosophizing. Any philosophy that doesn’t contribute to achieving liberation is meaningless. The detrimental element of philosophy is the false identification with the self and the ego. Identification and attachment with the “I” is a common sight in contemporary philosophy.

This established as the foundations upon which certain knowledge can be built. Doubting everything’s existence entails there is a doubter which must exist for the doubting to arise. If all that is usually known as true is a trick of an ‘evil genius’, there must be something existing that can be deceived, and this is what is using scepticism: the mind. To deny one’s own existence requires a contradiction of the mind as it is thinking, consequently it cannot think if it does not exist. This supposed incorrigible idea is dependent on the occurrent existence of thoughts.