It is a necessary transitional phase, cleansing and clearing away outdated value systems so that something new can rise in their place. He writes about two different forms of nihilism, active nihilism and passive nihilism. Passive nihilism is more the traditional ‘belief that all is meaningless’, while active nihilism goes beyond judgement to deed, and destroys values where they seem apparent. Passive nihilism signifies the end of an era, while active nihilism ushers in something new. Nietzsche considers nihilism not as an end, but as a means ultimately to the revaluation of values.
Critiques of Kantian moral philosophy on the basis of emptiness come from a variety of thinkers and from many different schools of thought. For example, Mill claims the universal law permits commonly immoral behavior and can only become consistent by resorting to Utilitarianism. ‘‘All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur’’ (Mill.Uti.162). Mill criticizes Kant for failing to identify ‘‘the actual duties of morality’’ (Mill.Uti.162). Mill’s critique derives from the Introduction of Utilitarianism, where he makes the claim that Kantian ethics, and all a priori abstract concept of ethics, derive from first principles (Kant’s the CI) that go unstated, leaving an actual description of action as elusive, and thus the prescriptive ethical determinations derived from the CI unable to inform action (Mill,
Subsequently, I will proceed to form an argument on the first part of Mackie’s argument from queerness, the metaphysical component. I will show that although the conclusion follows from the premises, not all the premises are true. Similarly for the epistemological component of Mackie’s argument, I will prove that the premises from his argument can be refuted. With the failure of both components, I will show that Mackie’s argument from queerness does not succeed in proving that objective values do not exist. Mackie’s argument from queerness is founded upon a naturalistic account of the world.
Human’s free will is one of the most debatable problems in the field of both philosophy and ethics. Does everybody has a control on his choices and actions or it all was determined in advance. According to the Scottish philosopher David Hume on the problem of free will: “the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science” . Free will is defined as the ability of humans to make decisions that are not determined by divine intervention or caused by a preceding cause . It is agreed by philosophers who dealt with the problem of free will that a human is not free to make a choice unless he could have done otherwise, in what is known as the principle of alternative possibilities .
Consequently, Hegel contends that Kant’s principle of morality remains merely formal because it has not justified the required content for instantiating the CI. Facing the narrow emptiness charge and broad emptiness charge, Kant’s defenders have clarified the validity of Kant’s morality by using different approaches by Kantian formalists and Kantian inspired non-formalists. The formalists defend a version of interpretation that holds that the moral law (mostly CI1)
The concept of free will is thoroughly of significance to German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche just as it is of relevance to all other existentialist philosophers alike. In understanding Nietzsche’s account against free will, it is of utmost importance to first be aware of his theory on human nature in general as the two are interconnected. For a strong believer in free will, Nietzsche’s philosophy might simply be regarded as the ‘other’ or the opposite view, that is, a determinist view of human nature. Nietzsche’s view, however, is not necessarily deterministic per se and it is wrong to label him as such since he goes beyond the belief that all our actions are pre-determined. While it seems as though Nietzsche explicitly denies the existence of free will, he often appeals to the notion of freedom, especially when he discloses his own ideal of humankind.
Kant’s first formulation of the CI is also named universalizability, all moral maxims must be universalizable. According to Kant, it is not rational to choose a world in which you cannot will the maxim of your action to be a universal law. This is where CI (moral maxims apply to everyone, for example, if you expect other people to keep their promises, then you are obligated to keep your own promises) are different from merely hypothetical ones which command conditionally on your having a relevant desire, the example would be an ‘ought’ statement of the form, ‘if you want A, then you ought to do B’. This is a hypothetical imperative, such as ‘Jack sees a cake, Jack ought not to eat it, as it is a means to keep healthy’. Such thinking appeals to our rationality and can be found in every major world religion most typically summarized in ‘The Golden Rule’ – treat other people as you want to be treated.
Mouffe envisage the model of 'agonistic' democracy that, far from imposing a general rational order, maintains both democratic pluralism and a realm of political conflicts and frictions. According to this view, 'the "other" is no longer seen as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an "adversary," i.e., somebody with whose ideas we are going to struggle but whose right to defend those ideas we will not put into question.' (Mouffe 1999, 755) In this respect, Habermasian theory that finds its justification in universalizing the procedures of justifications themselves 'is a conceptual impossibility.' (Laclau and Mouffe 2001,
In this respect, morality and Socratism are the expressions of a vital drive analogous to those which give birth to the figures of Apollo and Dionysus, as they are both connected to the metaphysical inquiry into the nature of things. Still, the Socratic worldview fails in seeing its dependency and connections to these drives, and thus fails to see its connection to life and its irrational kernel . According to Nietzsche, this mindset is the result of a pathology, as it gives too much merit to appearances while it excludes the Will from its view, making the former absolute and arranging them in a rational but insincere way. Socratism is then made of the same substance of the drives which inspire tragedy insofar as it is an expression of life, but, in both a literal and a metaphysical sense, it is the result of a sick form of this substance – it presents a metaphysical view of reality, just like art, but at the same time causes life to retreat within the safe walls of reasonableness, as by contrast art pushes the person to transcend them . In some respect, we can see here one of the seeds of Nietzsche’s later intuitions, and I believe there is no harm in employing them to elucidate this point.
Strawson viewed Hume as a skeptical realist. This position had him argue that Hume thought that there were causal powers. This view he made explicit in his essay, The Secret Connexion: “As far as causation as it is in the objects is concerned, Hume believes firmly in some sort of natural necessity or causal power.” According to the skeptical realist reading, Hume would have argued that in reality, there is indeed some secret necessary connection, which “binds the effect to the cause” and “renders one an infallible consequence of the other” . This is in spite of the fact that we are unable to know what this secret necessary connection is, which makes it a skeptical view. Thus a skeptical realist view is