In Response to McGrath’s Dilemma Against Moral Inferentialism An influential argument for moral skepticism is the moral regress argument (Sayre-McCord 1996). Moral inferentialists, who think we do have genuine moral knowledge, argue against the moral regress argument by rejecting the picture of justification one finds in the moral regress argument. Sarah McGrath (2004), in order to make room for her non-inferential moral perception account of moral knowledge, presents a dilemma against moral inferentialism, the thesis that all of our moral knowledge of particular cases is inferential. In particular, she challenges the most compelling version of moral inferentialism, which I call moral bridge inferentialism. In this paper, I argue that both horns of McGrath’s apparent dilemma turn out to lack argumentative weight against the moral bridge inferentialist.
In his article “Framing Moral Intuitions”, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong sets out to reject moral intuitionalism by questioning whether moral intuitions can be justified non-inferentially. He defines a moral intuition as a strong and immediate belief (Sinnott-Armstrong, 47) and for it to be justified non-inferentially is to be able to justify it independently of any other belief (Sinnott-Armstrong, 48). His primary aim is to demonstrate that many of our moral intuitions are unreliable and consequently, that no moral intuition can be justified without inference. He does this by citing several studies that demonstrate how moral intuitions can be subject to “framing effects”. Framing effects are the effects that wording and context can have on our
This theory opposes the belief in the objectivity of moral truth. Moreover, there is no universal truth in ethics, only various cultural codes instead. On the other point of view, it has been suggested that the world should derive an objective truth in every action. This essay will argue against the existence of objective truth in
The issue of circularity with the syllogistic view no longer applies because it no longer makes sense: if a point is self-evident there is no room for circularity. If the Cogito is self-evident, then there cannot possibly be circularity. Likewise, if the Cogito is self-evident, then the objection I raised regarding the reliability of logic itself does not hold, as no logic is needed to arrive at something that is self-evident. Therefore the Cogito, if it is self-evident, is sound. As a result, the Cogito as a self-evident fact and intuition successfully defeats the strongest skeptical point that we cannot even know if we exist, and Descartes conclusion of the Cogito
Whilst utilitarianism supports democracy and encourages people to act selflessly, it is due to the intuitive dislike that utilitarianism prompts in the minds of many, that it has been subject to several criticisms. In this essay, I will use both moral intuitions and examples to outline three of the strongest objections to utilitarianism. I will furthermore illustrate how such objections ultimately show utilitarianism to be unsuccessful. To achieve this it is, however, necessary that I discuss the concept of utilitarianism, as well as how such a theory influences the decisions and actions of moral agents. Utilitarianism is a moral, consequentialist theory that holds that the right action to perform is that which produces the best consequences,
The basis of the argument is the use of logic, which means that to prove that God exists one needs not apply experience. The Archbishop developed this argument to disapprove the fool mentioned in Psalms 14:1 who says that God does not exists. Anselm argues that the position taken by this fool is self-contradictory. In the verse
The first trend is well known as the moral Platonism which is implied in the transcendental dialectic, and then implicated in the canon of pure reason. The second trend typically known as ‘formalism,’(the foundation of his transcendental philosophy) is an ethic relying on the notion of a law. Since Kant’s moral Platonism is indirectly opposed to formalism, by considering formalism more closely we can better analyze Kant’s tendency toward this trend. Initially, Kant compares formalism with science. In this analogy found repeatedly in both the Second Critique and Groundwork Kant points to both moral law and scientific law.
who concludes that ‘rational nature cannot be valuable in a Kantian world’. Actually, there are Kantians working on issues whether rationality could identify moral law. According to Hill, aside from Korsgarrd’s objection to realism, there are mainly two doubts whether Kant implies value realism. The first doubt arises from epistemological concerns. Kant states that it is possible for all of us to possess moral knowledge; given that we construct value it is clearly plausible that we can know what is valuable.
Yet, the constructivist view of Kantian ethics may present a contradiction: if morality is entirely constructed by human rationality, then there should not be a universal principle which one would need “to receive” in order to regulate decisions. Thus, as Kant rejects authority and experience, through reason and textual analysis, drawing both from Kant’s writing and Augustine’s City of God, it is imperative to reconcile the conflict between the realist—that morality exists independent of rationality—and constructivist readings of Kant’s ethics. That “in practical common reason, when it cultivates itself, a dialectic inadvertently unfolds [...] and one is therefore [unable] to find rest anywhere but in a complete critique of our reason” lends credence a constructivist
So to my wonder, would there be philosophical thinking without free will? Some philosophers, to my surprise, do believe free will is an illusion. Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument, argues that nothing can be causa sui or that nothing can be the cause of itself (On Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument, Pg. 1). Causa sui states that “we can never be ultimately morally responsible for our actions” (Your Move: The Maze of Free Will, Pg.1).
Two of the most well respected philosophers of their time Kant and Mill share their views as different as they might be. Kant’s basis is categorical imperative. In the writings of Grounding for the Metaphysics of morals it is described as “act only according to the maxim whereby you can… will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 30). The other main point that Kant makes in his agreement is that we should not treat people as means but as ends themselves (36). Mill has a different stance, he states his principle in Utilitarianism “Greatest Happiness Principle”.