In his treatise, On the Essence of Human Freedom, Schelling offered a principle which rejects a dualism of evil and good, rejects the origination of wicked actions as an adversity, and refutes a picture of what he considers the Absolute as something that is meaningless, dormant, and immeasurable; containing the entire being of itself with no development or advancement. Schelling has additionally uncovered that these refuted expansions prompts issues concerning the nature of need and free will. In this manner, Schelling contends against a perspective of metaphysical need as geometric, argumentatively legitimate, or mechanical in nature. Furthermore, he contends against human free will being seen as a subjective action, in addition to his refute
Nihilists believe that if determinism is true, there is no free will. They take the stand that everything we do is caused by forces over which we have no control, and as such, we do not and never act freely since such forces cause our actions. Libertarians hold the view that at least some of our actions are not forced on us by the Laws of Nature. Instead, we have the ability to freely choose to perform those actions, and nothing makes us do so. They claim that human choices are not constrained like other events are.
How can moral judgement be passed if the concept (a subjective construct) responsibility and morality is detached from any objectivity? Furthermore, objectivity cannot be restricted by binaries such as good and evil. With that said, it seems life negating to pass moral judgement on a peer based on a code of morals without an objective foot to stand on. Nietzsche is also concerned with another leg of the traditional concept of responsibility: Causality. Nietzsche maintains that: Firstly, free will and unfree will does not exist and an actor does not act out of free will.
Consequently, Hegel contends that Kant’s principle of morality remains merely formal because it has not justified the required content for instantiating the CI. Facing the narrow emptiness charge and broad emptiness charge, Kant’s defenders have clarified the validity of Kant’s morality by using different approaches by Kantian formalists and Kantian inspired non-formalists. The formalists defend a version of interpretation that holds that the moral law (mostly CI1)
moral concerns and specifically stresses the concept of treating humanity not merely as means but as ends. However, Silber, like most Kantian formalists denies the possibility of supplementing C2. In Silber’s view, C2 as a limiting condition on valid maxims expresses merely a negative condition that one never treats others as means. Kant also explained that C2 acts solely as a limiting condition. In the idea of an absolutely good will [one] good without any qualifying condition (of attainment of this or that end)—complete abstraction must be made from every end that has to come about as an effect…And so the end must here be conceived, not as an end to be effected, but as an independently existing end.
By saying that ‘truth is subjectivity and subjectivity is truth,’ it seems as though Kierkegaard denies the objectiveness of truth, however, this is not the case as what he means by this, is that most essentially, truth is not just a matter of discovering objective facts. While objective facts are important, there is a more crucial element of truth, which involves how one relates oneself to those matters of fact, since how one acts is, from the ethical perspective (one that Hegel’s philosophy lacks), is more important than any matter of fact, truth is to be found in subjectivity rather than objectivity. For instance, Kierkegaard holds that one who prays in truth to an idol has more truth than on who prays in untruth to a true God, which implies that the ‘how’ is better than the
As discussed above, the expertise could not be the power they used. Secondly, command also did not fit the situation. In command power relations, the influence is seen legitimate, correct and justified (Scott, 2001, p. 21). Furthermore, a value consensus must be present (Scott, 2001, p. 21). In the experience, the command that required me to admit I was guilty and evil since birth surely could not be considered justified, not mentioning in my eyes their source of power was not legitimate as well.
That principle is referred to as the Practical Imperative. The fact that Nick and Marlee used the jurors to achieve their end-game is unacceptable as it violates that principle. Finally, Kant also spoke of obeying “...rules out of a sense of duty” (Thiroux and Krasemann 55). The Duty Ethics followed by Kantians that people must do something moral out of a sense of duty rather than an inclination. Judge Harkin represented this when he
Whereas John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle proffers a judicious moral schema for the regulation of societal intervention regarding individual liberty, it fails as an unequivocal method of establishing the limits of political authority within a civilised society. The aforementioned principle dictates “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection”. This principle advocates strongly for a protection of individual freedoms essential to the advancement of a society and though insufficient on its own, it must be given proper consideration concerning limits. the principle is flawed as it operates on the invalid assumption that there
For speculative reason, the concept of freedom was problematic, but not impossible. That is to say, speculative reason could think of freedom without contradiction, but it could not assure any objective reality to it…Freedom, however, among all the ideas of speculative reason is the only one whose possibility we know a priori. We do not understand it, but we know it as the condition of the moral law which we do know ( KpV3-4). With a completely different strategy in the First Critique where freedom was explicated in order to confirm the possibility of morality, Kant reverses this doctrine by noting that the moral law is the grounding of the possibility of transcendental freedom. Kant reverses the doctrine of the First Critique, i.e., freedom is possible only under the conceivability of acting in accordance with moral law when he writes: For had not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we would never have been justified in assuming anything like freedom…But if there were no freedom, the moral law would never have been encountered in us ( KpV4