General Robert E. Lee built a relationship with his generals through trust as Commander in chief. By allowing the generals to conduct missions on his behalf without giving them orders. This allowed General Lee and his army to be felixable during the war. General Lee divided his army in to four divisions and expanded them out thourgh the battlefield. The plan was to have the bulk of his army to cross Chickahominy and attack the Union north position. General Lee wanted General Jackson and his division to attack General Porter’s right position and allowing General Hill to move to Beaver Dam Creek follows right into Chickahomny. While attacking General Porter’s division General Lee had Gerneral Huger and General Magruder hold the line against McClelans …show more content…
General A.P Hill attacked Beaver Damn and was able to defeat the light line defending the damn. Taking the damn allowed General Lee continue his offensive attack with 57,000 men to take Gaines’s Mill. General Jackson was late to the battlefield and forced General Lee to order General Longstreet to distract General Porter men and to stabilize the front lines until General Jackson could arrive and attack from the north. General Slocum’s division was sent to reinforce General Porter and defend Gaines’s Mill. General Lee plan of attacking Gaines’s Mill with 57,000 men caused the federal army to withdraw and seize Gaines Mill. General Magruder made General McClellan to focus his attention on him by employing diversionary attacks from the south, while the main focus of General Lee army was attacking the north. General McClellan ordered his army to withdraw back into Harrison’s Landing during the night on June 27th. While McClellan was withdrawing, General Magruder moved forward to perform an reconnaissance to locate McClellan army. Conducting the reconnaissance Magruder orderd General Toombs’ brigade to attack McClellan army. General Toombs’ brigade was easly stopped and made them retreat back. Magruder ordered Toombs’ brigade to conduct a reconnaissance on June 28th. The reconnaissance turned to an attacked lead by General Toomb and resulted in a defeat for the …show more content…
Lee’s plan was to have his Generals (A.P. Hill and Longstreet) divisions to move around Richmond and move southeast while General Holmes division go farther south to Malvern Hill. Lee ordered Magruder’s division attack the rear guard of the Federal army from the east. General Jackson was ordered to rebuild the bridge at Chickahominy and link up with Magruder division. The plan was to have General Jackson and General Magruder to attack the Union Army with a heavy blow at Savage’s Station. While the attack from Lees Generals was being conducted, General Jackson was not moving south, because he was under the impression from General Lee’s Chief of staff that Lee wanted his division to build and guard the bridge. General Magruder was attacking 14,000 men against General Summer’s 26,650 men causing a stalemate. On June 30th General Jackson arrived to the battlefield to late to defeat the Union Army as General Lee
A few of Magruder’s men attempted an attack once again near Garnett’s and Gouldin’s farms, but just like before, were had barely an impact. As McClellan retreated to the river, Lee gave orders to then pursue McClellan in hopes of destroying his army. While Magruder and Huger fixed the Union rear guard in place, Jackson and D. H. Hill would cross the Chickahominy River while following the army, and Longstreet and A. P. Hill would circle and attempt to disturb the Union retreat. The next day, the Confederates initiated their plan to pursue McClellan. Between the Confederate Generals there was a lot of confusion, as Huger received conflicting orders, and then spent most of the day marching back and forth, while Magruder was unsure whether or not the Union army would attack.
Not only did Lee lead by providing purpose, direction, and motivation but General Lee also accurately assessing the battle. “Commanders continuously assess the situation to better understand current conditions and determine how the operation is progressing. Continuous assessment helps commanders anticipate and adapt the force to changing circumstances.” Lee assumed risks, such as invading with an inferior force, knowing that his generals were capable of carrying out his plans. With extensive information about the enemy’s size and whereabouts, he could accurately assess the risks.
In the spring of 1864 Grant pursued Lee throughout Virginia, while the union General william T. sherman moved towards atlanta, with his army of 100,000 men, still excited about winning their past battles in southern tennessee. But they ran into a resistance of Joseph Johnston. He lead an army of less people, but they were more experienced than the Union Army. Johnston’s tactics were shaped by the military realities and politics. He realized that Lincoln’s re-election was doubtful.
Lee would use his exquisite leadership in future battles such as the attempt of the Union to capture the Confederate capital of Richmond; he would turn the tables against the Union general George B. McClellan to take
This battle was both a failure and a success for the Confederates. Bragg’s main plan was to cut off Rosecrans’ main line of communication. This plan was not accomplished by any means. Bragg’s attack caused Rosecrans’ front to be centered around his line of communication (Nashville Pike). Rosecrans’ army, the Army of Cumberland, lost many more troops than Bragg.
Hooker modified the plan, and this time set about launching an attack on the Confederates from the front and rear. Stoneman was to retry his crossing, while 42,000 men would simultaneously try to cross the river upstream at Kelly’s Ford, and proceed to Chancellorsville. A further 40,000 troops under the command of John Sedgwick would attempt to cross the Rappahannock south of Fredericksburg and launch an assault on the Confederates’ right flank, a section commanded by Stonewall Jackson. The remainder of his army, numbering some 25,000 men would remain at the Falmouth camp, and act as a diversionary force to conceal the pincer movement from the Confederates.
According to historynet.com, Lee and his army had the confidence and courage to beat their adversaries and that’s what brought them to victory. Lee and his army stopped many tries from the Union to take over the Confederates Capital. He had a plan to receive victory against the
Yet another tactical error on the part of General McClellan was not renewing his attack on Lee’s forces on 18 September. Lee’s forces were still in their position and McClellan had that numerical advantage which now included 30,000 fresh troops decided not to attack. This allowed Lees the opportunity and time to retreat across the Potomac and
Custer ordered his troops to charge but this wasn’t easy as the setting for this battle was very unforgiving. Primarily woods and shrubs, the Union army couldn’t mobilize that well and lost organization, however; Custer’s troops were far more prepared for battle than those of General Walker, who had not been preparing supper instead of war at the time. Custer and his troops were successful in attacking and capturing the artillery of General Walker and this helped the Union gain ground on the battlefield. With this foothold, the Union now blocked off Lee’s path of retreat. General Lee now had only two options: fight or surrender.
Problems that Lee’s army had included the following: his troops were out of order because of one of his generals,and some of his generals got sick and couldn't take control. Lee wanted to hit General Sturt but then he said, “ You are the eyes and the ears of my
Braggs plan was to attack the Confederates right side of troops and begin toward the south to get Union troops away from Chattanooga. Union reinforcements began to help and pushed back the Southerners, even though Confederates were still attacking. Union soldiers stayed alive, bloodily and protected the rest from attacks by Polk’s troops. Mid-day of September 20, Rosecrans assumed that Union troops created a divide and moved the Confederates out of position.
General Lee had an army half the size of General Hooker’s, however he was able to use military tactics such as the element of surprise to surround them and push the entire might of the army towards a smaller, more open area where General Lee’s army could attack more easily. According to Sylvia Whitman (2016), an article writer for the database Ebscohost, “The surprise attack succeeded. Jackson pushed the Union troops nearly two miles back toward Chancellorsville” (A Win and a Loss at Chancellorsville). This quote proves how efficient General Lee’s army was in overcoming the obstacle of a much larger army. General Lee’s army was another key factor in the surprising outcome of the Battle of Chancellorsville and the effect on the Civil
Lee was so fearless he determined to invade the North reiteratively. Robert E. Lee strategy was to drift the fighting away from Virginia and into the Union Territory. He wanted to move the fighting, because the Confederate were under siege in Virginia. Lee hoped to gain recognition from Britain and France for the Confederacy. Joesph Hooker,the Union commander, was exposed to the worst defeat of the Army of Potomac in the Battle of Chancellorsville.
John B. Hood’s headquarters warned Gen. Joseph that they will be attacking the Confederates on the left .The attack was to weaken the Confederates and to destroy their supply lines. When the Confederates got word of the attack, they moved 2 groups of men back to prepare for a future attack. If they didn’t get word that he was going to be attacked from the left, his men would have been defenceless because he was protecting the right. William T. Sherman was forced to take extreme precaution when it came to this battle.
What led to this battle, was General Robert. E. Lee, was leading his army to Pennsylvania, to try to gain a food advantage over the North. Unbeknownst to both sides, this would be the first battle in the North. Lee had hoped that with a northern victory, external countries would view the south as an organized country, and not a group of “rag tag bandits”, as some northerner’s called the south. He also hoped that a northern victory would finally make the Union allow the South to become its own country.