Accordingly, the “ Japanese Emperor Hirohito was one of the Japanese officials who expressed reservations about going to war” (Timms). While the Imperial Navy’s Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, who was also known as the “chief architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor, stated that he believed it was impossible for Japan to win such a war but Japan had to gain the upper hand at the very beginning so that the United States just might be enticed to the negotiating table” (Timms). Hotta revealed her own interpretation by reviewing relevant published primary sources and the reasons why Japan decided to attack the Pearl Harbor. In addition, everyone talked about going to war such as the “Japan’s top brass referring to the prime minister, the foreign minister, the army and navy ministers, and the chiefs of the army and navy general staff”
in January 1943 was important because it confirmed that Sicily would be the next invasion after North Africa. During the conference the British and U.S. planners had many debates about the next phase of the war. The U.S. had committed to the “Germany First” policy, but also felt strongly that they needed to press the Japanese in the Pacific. The British wanted to invade Sicily and focus their operations and resources on the Mediterranean. The U.S. was concerned that a large Mediterranean commitment would consume assets and slow down operations in the Pacific.
Thesis statement: Though many speculate that the act of dropping the atomic bomb on Japan (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) while not doing so on Europe (Germany and Italy) was racially motivated, racism played little to no role in these bombings. The United States of America and her allies were willing to end World War II at any cost, had the atomic bombs been available they would have been deployed in Europe. In the 1940’s there is no doubt that the United States of America was engulfed by mass anti-Japanese hysteria which inevitably bled over into America’s foreign policy. During this period Japanese people living in both Japan and the United States of America were seen as less that human. Japanese-Americans living on the west coast were savagely and unjustifiably uprooted from their daily lives.
In general Kaiser Willhelm II’s foreign policy on these countries leaded to the First World War. Maybe because countries didn’t expect that big difference between Bismarcks and Wilhem II’s foreign policy. In 1890 Wilhelm II dismissed Bismarck from office. Bismarck left behind a political system designed to give maximum power to the Kaiser and his Chancellor. 2 So Wilhelm II’s foreign policy started.
Compared to Bismarck, who chose really conservative politics between the 1870s and 1880s, Wilhelm opted for a militaristic and expansionist political path, in order to defend Germany’s “Place in The Sun”. Many people believe that Kaiser Wilhelm’s role wasn’t as important for the outbreak of war, but what happened in the past proves the exact opposite, by realising that military and foreign campaigns were the main objectives of the Kaiser we can see a strong connection between the Wilhelmine policy, the Kaiser and the beginning of World War I in 1914.
However in Roosevelt’s speech he wanted the people to agree to end the policy of neutrality and help our allies. Whereas in Kennedy’s speech he wanted both the people of the United States and our foreign allies to focus on what connects us instead of what separates us. On January 6, 1941, Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave his Four Freedoms speech as a state of the union address. At this point in time the world, specifically Eurasia, was in complete chaos. Hitler and the Nazis had already taken over Norway, Poland and Belgium.
Appeasement was a policy adopted by Britain during the 1930s. This policy developed from the growing belief that some countries, especially Germany, had been unfairly treated in the peace settlement of 1918-1919.It is the name given to the French and British policies during the 1930s intended to end war by giving in to Germany, Japan, and Italy’s demands; on matters generally to be of substantial, if not vital, interest to the powers making the demands between 1935 and 1939. When Germany began to demand aggressively that some terms in the Versailles treaty should be taken out, some people argued that this was only right. If their unfair act could be settled by negotiation, it would avoid the need for the aggression. Once Germany was "appeased"
If Britain hoped to gain the upper hand they would need to have not only a better strategy but also be appropriately equipped. Germany, unfortunately was already demonstrating impressive military might in Spain. Initially Germany had rejected the leaders of the military uprising request to help the military uprising during the Spanish civil war in the 1930’s but eventually Hitler relented and gave Germany’s support. This battles gave the dictator an excuse to test-run his army and leave a bold impression on the world. In addition, Hitler’s interference brought Germany closer to Italy, who was also supporting the military uprising,, ultimately befriending the Italians and gain a potential ally for his struggle against the British and the French.
The distrust throughout the countries led to treaties pledging that certain countries would defend each other, which separated the countries outside of the pledges further (Adelblue “Setting the Stage for War”). This only increased the tension, as each country began taking sides, and set the stage for the war. Eventually, Germany began to fear that the French were seeking revenge from a previous war, the Franco-Prussian War. Germany knew that France wouldn’t attack alone, so they quickly took action and formed the Triple Alliance. Germany signed a treaty with Austria-Hungary and Italy, enforcing the fact that each country was beginning to take sides (Adelblue “Setting the Stage for War”).
(Dedman, 2010) Moreover, the UK was in danger of becoming politically isolated. In the late 50s and early 60s, there was intense debate between pro- and anti-Common Market factions in UK politics (Goodman, 1996). When the former finally won out in light of EEC’s commercial success, Britain made its first formal application to join in 1961 but was blocked unilaterally by Charles de Gaulle in 1963. ‘He regarded Britain as America’s “Trojan Horse” in Europe (allowing greater US penetration of the Common Market)’ (Dedman, 2010). The Labour government applied to join the EEC again in 1967 and was once more rejected by de