Humanitarian Intervention During The 1994 Rwandan Genocide

Humanitarian intervention is “an armed intervention in another state, without the agreement of that state, to address (the threat of) a humanitarian disaster, in particular caused by grave and large-scale violations of fundamental human rights”. (Goodman 2006) The effectiveness of humanitarian intervention has been the subject of international discussion. (Thakur 2006).

In this case study I will assessing the effectiveness humanitarian intervention during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. From April to June, Hutu extremists killed 800, 000 to one million Tutsi civilians and Hutu moderates. I will do this by examining the humanitarian intervention provided by the United States and Belgian forces, the International Committee of the Red Cross and

The Clinton administration orders to withdraw peacekeeping forces and troops from Rwanda is attributed to the noninterventionist policy enforced after the death of 18 soldiers in the failed 1993 intervention in Somalia. The Belgium government, pressured by public opinion withdrew their forces from Rwanda after 10 UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda) soldiers were killed by Hutu extremists. The withdrawal of troops has been criticised as it has been argued that the Clinton administration and the Belgium government were aware of the extreme tension between the Hutus extremists and the Rwanda Parotic Front (A political group of Rwandan Exiles) in response to the death of Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana on the 6th April 1994, and were warned by peacekeeping forces of the Hutu extremists plans to exterminate the Tutsi population. (Stanton 2009) According to Sliver, the ineffectiveness and lack of political will of the Belgium and U.S governments to provide humanitarian intervention was highlighted on April 9th to 11th 1994 when they sent troops to evacuate their citizens from Rwanda (Sliver 2015). This is reinforced by Beardsley, who notes that “We basically had our intervention force on the ground, but it wasn’t there to save Rwandans. It was there to save white

The United Nations Security Council ordered Roméo Dallaire , head of the UN peace-keeping not to use force and intervene against the Hutu extremists to prevent the killing of Tutsis and Hutu moderates. Dallaire urged the UN to increase his force to 5,000 troops, and informed the UNSC of the extremist Hutu’s regimes plans to kill Tutsis and their political opponents with machetes. Yet, the UNSC voted to withdraw 90 percent of the peacekeeping force from Rwanda. (Stanton 2009) Dallaire’s force was decreased from 2,500 troops to 270 ill -equipped troops from developing countries. This jeopardised the capability of his force to protect the citizens of Rwanda and enforce intervention. According to Stanton, the lack of UN humanitarian intervention hindered the protection of Rwandan citizens during the genocide. This is due to the fact that the members of the UN undermined the “right to life” and the “right not be subjected to torture… degrading treatment” as stated under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the responsibility to prevent genocide under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Stanton 2009). When the UNSC voted on Resolution 929 on June 22nd which authorized humanitarian efforts in Rwanda until 5000 UNAMIR troops were deployed; the genocide was already concluded (Ghosts of