In the Groundwork, the notion of the good does not rely on feeling or sensation; rather than it derives from the rational directly. Kant points out that every motive has an intended effect on the world. When desire drives us, we first examine the possibilities that the world leaves open to us, selecting some effect at which we wish to aim. But, if we act in accord with practical moral law, we encounter a significant difference since the only possible object of the practical law is the Good, since the Good is always an appropriate object for the practical law. Viewing the Good as rational consolidates
Was his lie just? To evaluate this question I would rely on Immanuel Kant 's deontology that state we should treat humans as an end and never merely as means. After explaining it, I will argue that lying to the Vichy authorities was the right thing to do because the value of life is higher than the duty not to lie. I will defend this argument by discussing one of the critiques on deontology. The goal of deontology is to find a categorical, unconditional imperative that will enable the creation of universal laws of nature, legislated by rational and free beings.
In the first place, since all obligations are supreme, it can’t help us to resolve conflicts ( for instance, telling the truth about something or protecting somebody that you love). The second problem with his theory is that it doesn’t take feelings into account. What Kant does say is that any accidental maxims that would require coercing somebody into doing something without consent or deceiving someone is wrong ( O’Neill, 113). But what O’Neill says is that when we act on such maxims we treat others as mere means and as things rather than as ends in themselves. Evidently she says, “if we act on such maxims, are acts or not only wrong button just: such acts wrong the particular others who are deceived or coerced” (O’Neill, 114).
KANT AND FREE WILL Introduction At first place in the chapter 1 of GMM, Kant tries to demonstrate that there is a moral law which is driven from the sense of moral obligations. He identifies how the moral law possibly driven from the sense of moral obligations that motive us to act morally. Kant simply implies that a universal moral law that can be only exist in kind of formula determining if an action is moral or not. He named the formula Categorical Imperative which can be basically defined as “Always act so that you can will the rule of your action to be a universal law.” It is ‘categorical’ because it is not ‘hypothetical’ or ‘contingent’ on anything, but is always and everywhere ‘universal’. Because it is called an ‘imperative’
By saying that ‘truth is subjectivity and subjectivity is truth,’ it seems as though Kierkegaard denies the objectiveness of truth, however, this is not the case as what he means by this, is that most essentially, truth is not just a matter of discovering objective facts. While objective facts are important, there is a more crucial element of truth, which involves how one relates oneself to those matters of fact, since how one acts is, from the ethical perspective (one that Hegel’s philosophy lacks), is more important than any matter of fact, truth is to be found in subjectivity rather than objectivity. For instance, Kierkegaard holds that one who prays in truth to an idol has more truth than on who prays in untruth to a true God, which implies that the ‘how’ is better than the
According to Kant, the categorical imperative is “what makes a will good is its conformity with the moral law”. His categorical imperative is a deontological ethical theory, which denotes the idea of existence
Kant argued that it was Hume's philosophy, flinched from the "dogmatism". However, in the changed context and something unlike Hume, Kant had just sense a source of moral norms. The changed context consisted in the fact that Kant does not ask how to justify all value judgments in the same way, rather than separately dealing with the so-called morality in the narrow
Kant at various places says that the formulas of the CI are equivalent, but he also often treats them as separate principles (referring to my third chapter).CI1 and CI2 are equivalent in a sense that CI1 plus a rational requirement to treat one’s own humanity as an end in itself entails CI2. However, CI1 and CI2 (as I understand it) could be separate principles. By itself, CI1 does not specify the standards of rational willing that determine whether a person could accept a moral principle or not, it basically requires us to act in ways that are justifiable to others. CI2 is a principle requiring humanity in oneself and others to be treated as an end in itself, which would be the Kant’s intention of moral content to refute the emptiness
This is a definition that summarizes an understanding of the theory in which that term is a key element. Unlike lexical definitions, which aim at helping us understand how a concept is used, theoretical definitions attempt to help us understand how a concept is. Theoretical definitions are mostly used in science and philosophy. A philosophical example of the use of theoretical definitions was when Socrates struggled to find a correct definition for “justice”. Philosophers are not merely looking for a set of words that can serve as synonyms to define a term like justice, nor are they examining how people use such words or trying to eliminate borderline cases (Copi, Cohen and Mcmahon).
Consequently, Hegel contends that Kant’s principle of morality remains merely formal because it has not justified the required content for instantiating the CI. Facing the narrow emptiness charge and broad emptiness charge, Kant’s defenders have clarified the validity of Kant’s morality by using different approaches by Kantian formalists and Kantian inspired non-formalists. The formalists defend a version of interpretation that holds that the moral law (mostly CI1)