How can moral judgement be passed if the concept (a subjective construct) responsibility and morality is detached from any objectivity? Furthermore, objectivity cannot be restricted by binaries such as good and evil. With that said, it seems life negating to pass moral judgement on a peer based on a code of morals without an objective foot to stand on. Nietzsche is also concerned with another leg of the traditional concept of responsibility: Causality. Nietzsche maintains that: Firstly, free will and unfree will does not exist and an actor does not act out of free will.
Mackie’s argument from queerness is founded upon a naturalistic account of the world. The main idea of the argument from queerness seems to imply that we should not believe in the existence of objective values because they would not fit in with a naturalistic world. He is convinced that there are no moral facts and properties, and we cannot possibly have moral knowledge. There are two parts in Mackie’s argument from queerness, one metaphysical and the other epistemological. The metaphysical component
As the existentialist says “human beings cannot be understood as entities with fixed characteristics or as subjects interacting with a world of objects” [ CITATION Sch17 l 1033 ]. And perhaps this is as it should be. Life should have some mystery to it. It is that mystery that lends itself to self-discovery. And is self-discovery not the path of the
Yet, the constructivist view of Kantian ethics may present a contradiction: if morality is entirely constructed by human rationality, then there should not be a universal principle which one would need “to receive” in order to regulate decisions. Thus, as Kant rejects authority and experience, through reason and textual analysis, drawing both from Kant’s writing and Augustine’s City of God, it is imperative to reconcile the conflict between the realist—that morality exists independent of rationality—and constructivist readings of Kant’s ethics. That “in practical common reason, when it cultivates itself, a dialectic inadvertently unfolds [...] and one is therefore [unable] to find rest anywhere but in a complete critique of our reason” lends credence a constructivist
In Wiggins’ case of fission he undermines the belief that all questions of personal identity must have answers. The belief when asked in response to brain division is found implausible. According to Parfit, ‘If all the possible answers are implausible, it is hard to decide which of them is true, and hard even to keep the belief that one of them must be true’. (1971, p.8) He also undermines the second belief that personal identity plays a part in survival. Wiggins’ case shows that you may not have identity but you may have everything you need for survival.
This theory opposes the belief in the objectivity of moral truth. Moreover, there is no universal truth in ethics, only various cultural codes instead. On the other point of view, it has been suggested that the world should derive an objective truth in every action. This essay will argue against the existence of objective truth in
Churchland assumes that people’s common-sense framework would be eliminated over time as it gives a misleading insight of human behaviors, cognitive abilities, and the nature of reality at large. The matter is that the eliminative materialist perspective is built according to a strong conviction that folk psychology is a “hopelessly primitive and deeply confused conception of our internal activities” (Churchland pg. 288). The main argument for eliminative materialism suggested by Churchland is the fact that folk psychology has proved unable to explain the fundamental materiality of the human essence, including the nature of learning, memory, and mental
Kant argued that it was Hume's philosophy, flinched from the "dogmatism". However, in the changed context and something unlike Hume, Kant had just sense a source of moral norms. The changed context consisted in the fact that Kant does not ask how to justify all value judgments in the same way, rather than separately dealing with the so-called morality in the narrow sense, that is, the attitudes on which it is possible to agree all and make them subject to an obligation or duty and other value judgments in which it sets the request. This difference, which extends along ethic is well understood. You can consider that a good deal of long
Indeterminism which is the philosophical view opposing determinism. Many versions of indeterminism views were proposed by various philosophers, but those versions, which intended to save “Free will”, did not actually succeed for reasons that are to be presented. The first version of indeterminism is the “non-causal indeterminism” which simply states that choice is not determined by prior reason-states, as reason-states are themselves “non-causal” (Ginet 1990). This argument raises a lot of problems, as it directly opposes the principle that any event has a prior cause. This idea of that some events are non-causal seems to be vain, because it does not work in a universe that is governed by deterministic physical laws, at least at the macro-scale
Husserl uses this reasonable claim by rejecting it in his phenomenology by showing us that the existence of the external world which exists beyond our knowledge and beliefs about it is doubtful, as the external world for a realist would still exist if even if there was no one to experience it, Husserl 's points out that there are little characteristics of realism that inform us on which entities belong to the real world. This puts Descartes in a position of vulnerability in Husserl 's phenomenology as it allows Husserl to point out Descartes failures and inconsistency within his method. When observing Descartes philosophy we are able to see his perspective, high influence and position within the study of Husserl 's phenomenology, his standing in this philosophy is of great importance as it bases the origination of most of Husserl 's