Rawls was dissatisfied with the traditional philosophical arguments about what makes a social institution just and about what justifies political or social actions and policies. The utilitarian argument holds that societies should pursue the greatest good for the greatest number. This argument has a number of problems, including, especially, that it seems to be consistent with the idea of the tyranny of majorities over minorities. The intuitionist argument holds that humans intuit what is right or wrong by some innate moral sense. This is also problematic because it simply explains away justice by saying that people “know it when they see it,” and it fails to deal with the many conflicting human intuitions.
In other words, it’s recognized but never has been carried out. • Society needs to try and realize the conception of distributive justice and the circumstances that are permitted (in the example given its related to common good) • Corresponding to Moral desert, under the
This alternative system of justice is described as ‘justice as fairness’. The name ‘justice as fairness’ is apt only because the ‘original position’ is fair, hence it becomes the most important methodological device as the principles are a result of a fair agreement or bargain (Rawls, 13). The aim of this paper is to understand ‘justice as fairness’ by rationally deducing it, using the ‘original position’ as the main methodological concept to do so. Thus we can equate this process of rational deduction to procedural justice. This essay is first going to answer the question, what is meant by ‘justice as fairness’, by looking at ‘justice as fairness’ as a conception
In this essay, I will explain John Rawls’s argument concerning distributive justice and Roland Dworkin’s argument concerning why a government should be a welfare state, as well as arguing for the fair and just treatment for those least advantaged in society, whatever that society might look like. Rawls’s argument in favor of distributive justice begins with his initial overall idea that one’s ability to lead a good life should not be based upon things one cannot control, such as his endowments, but instead based upon one’s ambition. This gives everyone the same opportunity in achieving success within their life. Being ambition-sensitive is key to his argument because one’s success should be based upon the work they put into life (their ambition)
This is the reason why Rawls referred to the original position also as the “veil of ignorance”. Furthermore, from this idea of original position, Rawls developed the idea of “justice as fairness”. According to the author it is fair to decide the meaning of justice in the original position where men are ignorant, therefore they are not influenced by their proper envy. No one is jealous of the other, no one tries to steal other men’s properties for his own seek or the one of the whole society. Rawls’ aim was to not violate human rights, and with his theory, the violation of human rights is not possible due to the existence of the original position and the veil of ignorance.
In this last principle, Kant understands that there is the possibility (or ‘capacity’) for anyone to act morally, and describes what this action would look like in practice. It explains why we are hesitant to try to put a value on a person’s life, and why most people would refuse to even attempt such a thing. For example, money would introduce a ‘conditional’ value that is not permitted in Kant’s view. “For other beings such as human beings whose rational capacities govern a will that might be moved by various incentives, temptations, and fears, the representation of something as good or required is not, by itself, sufficient for action. In such beings, the determination by their reason that some option is good or required presents itself as a kind of command as the judgment that they ought to act accordingly (even if they want not to).
In all theories of justice, the reciprocity, necessity, cooperation are the most important concepts defining the idea of justice and they provide me a solid base for rejecting the rationality assumption. The relation between functionings, capabilities and agency seems to be very important in order understand the human motivation that cannot be taught separately from the social relations.If good life is defined in terms of the set of valuable “beings and doings”, it is then important to focus on what people can ‘actually do’, namely their substantive freedoms and more importantly their autonomy degrees and fields that can be thought only in relational terms. In this sense, I find very useful to think with Bourdieu’s concepts in order to understand the framing of what one can ‘actually do’, because although these theories are useful to gain a normative framework, Bourdieu’s analysis are more practical (Calhoun & Wacquant, 2002) and aim to understand the processes and experiences of inequalities. The capabilities (which I find very interesting conceptual and also methodological tool) which makes me think about the concept of habitus, are shaped by not only laws and policies, but also by a set of norms and values that are legitimated and reproduced in discourse, perception and
Justice is one of the most important moral and political concepts. Justice is the legal or philosophical theory by which fairness is administered. Philosophers want to get further than etymology and dictionary definitions to consider, for example, the nature of justice as both a moral virtue of character and a desirable quality of political society, as well as how it applies to ethical and social decision-making. Theories of distributive justice concern what is distributed, between whom they are to be distributed, and what is the proper distribution. Egalitarians argued that justice can only exist within the coordinates of equality.
Firstly, the SR interpretation makes an illicit move from the epistemological claim that “All that we are aware of are constant conjunctions” to the ontological claim that “There exists causally necessary connections” . As an empiricist, it would have been impossible for Hume to have made such a jump over the epistemological gap. Strawson argued that it is untrue that there is only regular succession, just because we only see regular successions. However, while this proves that it is not possible to rule out the existence of causal powers over and above regular succession, it fails to prove that Hume made a positive ontological claim that there were causal powers. As an empiricist, Hume would have held the view that all knowledge must be derived from experience.
In the experience, the command that required me to admit I was guilty and evil since birth surely could not be considered justified, not mentioning in my eyes their source of power was not legitimate as well. Some people would contend that both sides in that room still had a kind of consensus, which is that a person should not offense the party. However, when facing an authority with his unforeseeable possible punitive resorts, the only way to avoid them is not to explicitly arguing against him. A seemly agreeable attitude did not