Magel said? Ask the experimenters why they experiment on animals, and the answer is, "Because the animals are like us." Ask the experimenters why it is morally okay to experiment on animals, and the answer is, "Because the animals are not like us." Animal experimentation rests on a logical contradiction. Animals are living creatures that have feelings just like a human being.
Galen Strawson argues in his work, The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility, the theory that true moral responsibility is impossible. This theory is accurate whether determinism is true or false. Strawson describes this argument as the Basic Argument. He claims "nothing can be causa sui- nothing can be the cause of itself" (212). Yet, one must be causa sui to achieve true moral responsibility.
Even the answer of Eichmann demonstrates how wrong Kantian ethics had been misused and misinterpreted by him. Nevertheless, according to Kantian ethics, a personal life should not have a confliction with the law which is another reason that indicates that Eichmann was not a true “proper”
Thoreau states, “ It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much for the right. The only obligation which I have to assume to do at any time what I think is right”(306). This indicating that Thoreau only followed laws that he believed were right and fair. He didn’t believe he needed to pay attention to unjust laws. Also he doesn’t believe you need to pay respect to unjust laws.
Cohen argues that if we follow the basic principle of equality, we have to assume the following consequences: (1) both humans and animals don’t have rights, (2) animals have the same rights as humans do. Cohen right out states that these two consequences are utterly absurd and therefore the basic principle of equality is false thereby making Singer’s argument unsound. Cohen’s objection [partly] relies on Immanuel Kant’s idea that in order to be able to possess rights, a being must have the moral ability to do i.e. be able to use the right(s) to govern itself and others. Because animals are unable to do this, they do not have rights.
I can understand how one can argue against animal welfarism when humankind has been conditioned to lack appreciation for non-human animals and use them for our own self-interest. On the other hand, there is an element of natural instinct that I believe is not considered when discussing contractualism related to animal
In chapter three we discovered that Rawlsian fairness requires that we give up our surplus to provide what others lack. This impartial perspective can only be achieved, however, under what Rawls terms a ‘veil of ignorance’ experienced by an autonomous legislator or an impartial spectator, respectively. Actually, Rawls argues at great length why we should accept the difference principle, namely because no one knows behind the veil of ignorance if he might end up as the least well-off, giving him a reason to adopt a risk-avoiding strategy, i.e. implementing the difference principle. It is prima facie unfair, according to Rawls, to allow the least-well-off to starve to death simply because of their own bad luck, which merely appears to point to ‘formal impartiality’ as ‘formally concerning for all’.
Animals. First and foremost, each of the following arguments defines animals as non-human, sentient entities. Animal rights positions, under this definition, are either not equal, sometimes equal, or always equal to humans. For this distinction, I will replay the concepts of Kant, Regan and Warren. To begin, Kant seemingly does not at first glance argue that animals do not have values, only that their value is not morally equal to that of humans.
Importantly, this cuts across species lines, and does not, due to fact of species membership, automatically accord humans a higher moral status over all other species of animal. This view isn't inherently interested in species, instead, in determining moral status, it focuses on whether or not an individual holds capacities of sentience and self-consciousness, and to what degree (Singer 2000: 320).