Kant's View Of Dignity And Non-Voluntary

The purely formal understanding of freedom and dignity that Hill and other Kantians humanists try to avoid is problematic. The problem, as I see it, is rooted in the denial of any other source of value in the world aside from persons. It is only by virtue of these other values that rational nature can exercise its distinctive capacities in a way that makes it worthy of respect.
In sum, my interpretation sees dignity as freedom in the non-formal sense. This value appears to deny independent reality. It is displayed in our everyday interactions with people and recognizes that the humanity of a person emerges from his or her capacity to recognize, appreciate, engage with, harmonize with and produce intrinsic good. As a result, humans bring unique and distinctive characteristics to the world and establish their dignity which is worthy of respect and hence not merely formalism.

Conclusion: Summary

In this chapter, I have presented a resolution of the problems arising from the versions of the emptiness charge mostly by reconsidering them in a non-formal sense.

This charge claims that the most distinctive and important feature in Kant’s ethics is not his claims about the particular ethical duties that we owe to each other, but his views about the nature of value. In other words, moral action wholly exists deep inside of me rather than elsewhere. However, I argue that the possibilities for a formal theory of willing or the nature of value are based on Kantian universalization whereas the broad emptiness doctrine supports a theory rooted in the nature of value and employs different ways that in the end misunderstand the content of moral