Like the antecedent moralists, Kant appeals to the teleology of nature. Initially, in the first section of Groundwork Kant seems to echo Aristotle, but then takes great care to refute Aristotle’s expositions of virtues. As Kant moves to a discussion of the second and fourth illustrations which concern duties to others, his analogy with nature prevails. Kant draws again
Kant at various places says that the formulas of the CI are equivalent, but he also often treats them as separate principles (referring to my third chapter).CI1 and CI2 are equivalent in a sense that CI1 plus a rational requirement to treat one’s own humanity as an end in itself entails CI2. However, CI1 and CI2 (as I understand it) could be separate principles. By itself, CI1 does not specify the standards of rational willing that determine whether a person could accept a moral principle or not, it basically requires us to act in ways that are justifiable to others. CI2 is a principle requiring humanity in oneself and others to be treated as an end in itself, which would be the Kant’s intention of moral content to refute the emptiness
In this respect, morality and Socratism are the expressions of a vital drive analogous to those which give birth to the figures of Apollo and Dionysus, as they are both connected to the metaphysical inquiry into the nature of things. Still, the Socratic worldview fails in seeing its dependency and connections to these drives, and thus fails to see its connection to life and its irrational kernel . According to Nietzsche, this mindset is the result of a pathology, as it gives too much merit to appearances while it excludes the Will from its view, making the former absolute and arranging them in a rational but insincere way. Socratism is then made of the same substance of the drives which inspire tragedy insofar as it is an expression of life, but, in both a literal and a metaphysical sense, it is the result of a sick form of this substance – it presents a metaphysical view of reality, just like art, but at the same time causes life to retreat within the safe walls of reasonableness, as by contrast art pushes the person to transcend them . In some respect, we can see here one of the seeds of Nietzsche’s later intuitions, and I believe there is no harm in employing them to elucidate this point.
Because of this, we are left in Fichte’s theory just with subjectivity, not individuality. Hegel's scrutiny of Fichte surrounds his theory which sets nature as just the inverse of the self with a dualism. Hegel criticized Schelling in delineating his own origination of what the genuine arrangement of reason ought to envelop. As per Hegel, craftsmanship isn't the most noteworthy practice for capturing the absolute self, yet there is an existing subordinate psychological level in the self-development of the Absolute at this point. Hegel's alternative to the rationality of reflection recommends the need to change the Schellingian
Consequently, Hegel contends that Kant’s principle of morality remains merely formal because it has not justified the required content for instantiating the CI. Facing the narrow emptiness charge and broad emptiness charge, Kant’s defenders have clarified the validity of Kant’s morality by using different approaches by Kantian formalists and Kantian inspired non-formalists. The formalists defend a version of interpretation that holds that the moral law (mostly CI1)
By saying that ‘truth is subjectivity and subjectivity is truth,’ it seems as though Kierkegaard denies the objectiveness of truth, however, this is not the case as what he means by this, is that most essentially, truth is not just a matter of discovering objective facts. While objective facts are important, there is a more crucial element of truth, which involves how one relates oneself to those matters of fact, since how one acts is, from the ethical perspective (one that Hegel’s philosophy lacks), is more important than any matter of fact, truth is to be found in subjectivity rather than objectivity. For instance, Kierkegaard holds that one who prays in truth to an idol has more truth than on who prays in untruth to a true God, which implies that the ‘how’ is better than the
Kant’s first formulation of the CI is also named universalizability, all moral maxims must be universalizable. According to Kant, it is not rational to choose a world in which you cannot will the maxim of your action to be a universal law. This is where CI (moral maxims apply to everyone, for example, if you expect other people to keep their promises, then you are obligated to keep your own promises) are different from merely hypothetical ones which command conditionally on your having a relevant desire, the example would be an ‘ought’ statement of the form, ‘if you want A, then you ought to do B’. This is a hypothetical imperative, such as ‘Jack sees a cake, Jack ought not to eat it, as it is a means to keep healthy’. Such thinking appeals to our rationality and can be found in every major world religion most typically summarized in ‘The Golden Rule’ – treat other people as you want to be treated.
Kant argued that it was Hume's philosophy, flinched from the "dogmatism". However, in the changed context and something unlike Hume, Kant had just sense a source of moral norms. The changed context consisted in the fact that Kant does not ask how to justify all value judgments in the same way, rather than separately dealing with the so-called morality in the narrow
If, by trying to will what he has objective ground to will, he thereby frustrates the very thing he has objective ground to will, then it is not possible to will the principle of self-love to be universal law.19 If Wood is correct in his interpretation of Kant, then he seems to have provided a successful counterexample to Kant’s argument for FUL.20 19This example assumes that the principle of self-love is an objective principle on the basis of the objectivity of the end of happiness. However, it seems possible that the (hypothetical) objectivity of the end of happiness is better captured by some other practical principle. Perhaps there is another principle that is grounded in the end of happiness that actually could be willed to be universal law. Wood does not consider this possibility, but it seems relevant to the example. 20It is somewhat unclear whether Wood intends the violation of the categorical imperative to be a contradiction in the will of the egoist, or whether the result is a contradiction in conception/nature.
Empirical knowledge is constituted as a “fabric of interlocking sentences which hooks on to the neutral input at the observation sentences.” (Sommers:1994 qtd French, 22). However Quine’s naturalism differs from the definition of naturalism. Quine creates a new philosophical perspective known as “ Quine’s naturalism” which cannot meaningful or be understood without him. He basically took the naturalism which defined in the historically epistemic doctrines and re-arrange of modified version of naturalism which belongs to him. He uses this modified naturalism to defend his philosophical perspective against to idealism and realism.