Megapro Subjects

Literature Review
Multipolar perspectives on megaprojects
Infrastructure megaprojects and their challenges have been studied from varied perspectives since 1990s. The first polar perspective casts attention on institutional arrangements necessary for decision-making and selection of right megaprojects. However, the prescriptions emerging from this perspective do not fully acknowledge the institutionally complex context of megaprojects. We build arguments on the need to account for pluralistic institutions and fitting of megaprojects in a pluralistic context. We finally make concluding remarks on what makes dealing with the institutional environment of megaprojects exceptionally challenging. The second polar perspective highlights the importance

(2009) draw attention to institutional arrangements to (a) apportion accountability to the actors who bring out estimated costs, benefits and environmental and social impacts of megaprojects and (b) statistically forecast costs, benefits and impacts of megaprojects using reference classes. Cantarelli et al. (2010a) prescribe regulative arrangements for preventing lock-in at the decision-making level (before the decision to build megaprojects) and at the project level (after the decision to build to megaprojects). In their book on Large Transport Infrastructure Projects: Improving Institutions and Decision Making, Wee and Flyvbjerg (2010) put together articles which emphasize formulation of better regulative institutions to curb strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias during decision-making on megaprojects. Lessard and Miller (2000), Priemus (2008) and Samset (2008) also highlight the need for robust regulations to mitigate political influences in strategic decision making on

Moore (1998) opines that megaprojects can’t be executed simply by enacting legislations, procuring packages and awarding tenders. Megaprojects are virtually large enterprises (Kumaraswamy, 1997) that operate within exceedingly complex institutional environments (Scott, 2011). Drawing from Webb et al. (2009), we argue that a megaproject, while being unjustified based on regulative logics, can still be a legitimate project based on normative and cognitive logics. For example, air terminal-rail link megaprojects at Heathrow, Schiphol and CDG airports were unviable in the institutional context of the government body responsible for the selection of transportation projects but viable in the institutional context which evolved as a result of privatization of the airports (Givoni and Rietveld, 2008). Osland and Strand (2010) do not support the thesis that project approval is a result of planners’ strategic misrepresentation. Theoretically, they contend that politicians are at institutionally advantageous positions on most occasions to make rational choices on megaprojects based on their logics which are fundamentally different in comparison to rational logics of planners and regulative logics of project selection. Jong (2008) theorized how the institutional characteristics such as federalism, democracy, integralism and