One of the objections which I consider to be of strength is one regarding the over flexibility of the sanction principle. The in-built nature of utilitarianism as a theory, fails to impose plausible corrective consequences to those actions which do not comply with the stipulated rules of the moral theory. Though the theory claims to not promote actions of self benefit, it fails to blatantly rebuke actions contravening general morality, by offering acceptance to such given that the justification provided corresponds with the guidelines of the theory. This objection is of collorally effect to a line of criticisms. Bernard Williams presents a reasonable flaw of the theory not being able to uphold justice and fairness.
As stated in the textbook, Think Critical Thinking and Logical Skills For Everyday Life by Judith A Boss, there are two primary forms of moral theories. The first of these two theories are “those that claim that morality is relative” and the second is “those that claim that morality is universal” (Boss, 279). Moral relativists states that there is no universal law or view on what is considered to be morally right and what is morally wrong (Boss 279). In contrast, a universal morality states that there are specific moral values or views that all should follow (Boss, 279). Both of these views are filled with flaws.
This theory opposes the belief in the objectivity of moral truth. Moreover, there is no universal truth in ethics, only various cultural codes instead. On the other point of view, it has been suggested that the world should derive an objective truth in every action. This essay will argue against the existence of objective truth in
Kant offers that his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals “is nothing more than the identification and corroboration of the supreme principle of morality” (4:392). He maintains that people must use “practical philosophy”, or careful reasoning, in order to delineate the precise principle of human morality, which Kant later identifies and formulates as the categorical imperative. To understand this supreme principle of morality, Kant asserts the truth in two things: there exists morality, which regulates human behaviors and signifies good actions, and that this morality can be only understood through reason. Assuming that these are both true, it is not entirely clear what the ontological relationship is between human rationality and morality—whether
In his article “Framing Moral Intuitions”, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong sets out to reject moral intuitionalism by questioning whether moral intuitions can be justified non-inferentially. He defines a moral intuition as a strong and immediate belief (Sinnott-Armstrong, 47) and for it to be justified non-inferentially is to be able to justify it independently of any other belief (Sinnott-Armstrong, 48). His primary aim is to demonstrate that many of our moral intuitions are unreliable and consequently, that no moral intuition can be justified without inference. He does this by citing several studies that demonstrate how moral intuitions can be subject to “framing effects”. Framing effects are the effects that wording and context can have on our
In Response to McGrath’s Dilemma Against Moral Inferentialism An influential argument for moral skepticism is the moral regress argument (Sayre-McCord 1996). Moral inferentialists, who think we do have genuine moral knowledge, argue against the moral regress argument by rejecting the picture of justification one finds in the moral regress argument. Sarah McGrath (2004), in order to make room for her non-inferential moral perception account of moral knowledge, presents a dilemma against moral inferentialism, the thesis that all of our moral knowledge of particular cases is inferential. In particular, she challenges the most compelling version of moral inferentialism, which I call moral bridge inferentialism. In this paper, I argue that both horns of McGrath’s apparent dilemma turn out to lack argumentative weight against the moral bridge inferentialist.
The Divine Command Theory The Divine Command Theory is an ethical theory that states that God decides what is morally right and what is morally wrong. The theory argues that to be morally good one must do what God says and abstain from doing what God forbids. The question that is going to be discussed in this essay is if The Divine Command Theory provides an acceptable account of what makes an action morally right and others morally wrong. In this essay I will argue against the previously mentioned statement using the following arguments: The inconsistency between theists, the dependence of morality on religion and finally, Euthyphro’s dilemma. One problem with the Divine Command Theory is that it assumes that all its followers agree on what
“Is Morality Relative or are there Objective Moral Truths?” In A Defense of Ethical Relativism by Ruth Benedict from her “Anthropology and the Abnormal,” Journal of General Psychology, in her part take on Modern Social Anthropology, Benedict views ethical relativism as part of the new modern civilization in which each society has their own moral views and “like a work of art” each culture has a theme and certain tendencies which they chose to favor. On the contrary, The Case Against Moral Relativism by Louis P. Pojman, moral relativism is viewed as a misled argument by relativists and explains in detail some of the moral differences in each culture and how this affects humanity as a whole. Subjectivism, “Morality is in the eye of the beholder,”
In effect, Thrasymachus tries to invalidate the entire notion that justice should be a guiding moral principle: a strict or universal definition within these terms is not only unnecessary but also factually incorrect. This view presents an pessimistic position on the nature of humanity, and seems to suggest that there are no intrinsically good ways to live one’s life or structure a society. One could characterize these beliefs as a kind of nihilism. The idea of justice, from this point of view, is purely used under pragmatic
It is mere posturing to say that you are for or against “relativism” unless you say what you mean by the term. Moral relativism is the view that moral judgments are true or false only relative to some particular standpoint (for instance, that of a culture or a historical period) and that no standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others. It has often been associated with other claims about morality: notably, the thesis that different cultures often exhibit radically different moral values; the denial that there are universal moral values shared by every human society; and the insistence that we should refrain from passing moral judgments on beliefs and practices characteristic of cultures other than our own. Moral relativism has been identified with all the above positions; and no formula can capture all the ways the term is used by both its advocates and its critics. But it is possible to articulate a position that most who