Mahanian Maritime Superiority Essay

United States operations in the Pacific region during the war conflict with the Empire of Japan was comprised of a resourceful employment of sea, air, and land assets and a set of strategic doctrines that in the end resulted on the defeat and surrender of the Japanese forces and United States victory. Sea power and its attainment from a United States perspective played a critical and vital role in the Pacific conflict. It can be argued, based on a Mahanian perspective, that the rising of United States Forces victoriously in the war effort was the chief result of the maritime superiority and a considerable command presence at sea. Nonetheless, after the Coral Sea and Midway engagements, a more Corbettian doctrine, specifically during the Central Pacific Campaigns, is exhibited mainly by the utilization of air, surface and subsurface assets and tactical employment of sea units in order to deny the Japanese attainment of command at sea.

Mahan understanding of maritime superiority primarily focuses on sea power and its attainment as the most crucial element in the achievement of a nation’s greatness. This line of thinking is deeply based on the common idea that nations that typically rely in maritime expanse are dependent on superiority and command presence of the sea in order to protect crucial international trading. In contrast, Julian Corbett’s reasoning on sea power mainly focuses on the denial of command at sea to the enemy vice the attainment of it. Corbett believed that achievement of command at sea was important but not decisive, and that its inherently importance to a nation was undisputable but believed it to seldom allowed victories in itself. Corbett’s strategy favors, among other things, operations and actions of low risk as much as possible but robust and flexible that would allow for maximizing other applicable supporting joint operations and assaults to commerce