Major General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq Operational Environment
The state of Mosul’s operational environment dictated Major General Petraeus operational approach to military operations.
Operational Environment
The operational environment is a composite of conditions circumstances and influences that affect the employment capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 1-02). Mosul is the second largest city in Iraq, with a population of 1.7 million people. The Tigris River is located 250 miles North of Baghdad. Nested in Mosul is the Sunni triangle. Mosul is also fault line where various ethnic, religious, sectarian, and tribal groups intersect. In the city of Mosul, the distribution of the Sunni Arab is 70%, Kurd 25%,
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There was no economic infrastructure or administrative control when Saddam Hussein had overall control over economic activity at the beginning of the war. General David Petraeus assigned Colonel Anderson of the 101st, and his troops arrived in Mosul with minimal information about the city, its people, or the surrounding province. Major General Petraeus then assigned Colonel Anderson to reconnoiter Mosul and report back to him with an update. After Colonel Anderson arrival to Mosul, he heard conflicting reports from the 26th Marine expeditionary unit stating the area was dangerous when the Special Forces said it was much calmer. During Colonel Anderson "commander 's reconnaissance" tour around Mosul, he decided to form his own opinion of how he was going to deploy troops on the ground with recommendations from Major General Petraeus. General Petraeus landed in Mosul on April 22, when he decided to locate his hindquarters in Saddam Hussein 's former palace across the Tigris River a few kilometers north of Colonel Anderson. Major General Petraeus needed a location to accommodate thousands of staff, a signal battalion, military intelligence, civil affairs, and engineers. As troops begin to deploy, he started his own commander 's reconnaissance of the political, economic, military, and landscape. If Colonel Anderson failed to act quickly move soldiers into Mosul to occupy the area which is known as a breeding ground
On July 30, 2008, a bloody battle involving Coalition forces took place in the mountainous eastern Afghan province of Nuristan. This was the Battle of Wanat and the devastating amount of Coalition casualties began a vigorous investigation by the United States Army. The village of Wanat, defended by Second Platoon, Chosen Company, Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team would fall victim to numerous bad decision made by higher command. Although the men of Chosen Company fought hard, they ended up surrounded, vastly outnumbered, and without any Battalion assets. This paper will argue the reasons for the disastrous outcome of the Battle of Wanat; examining the effective company leadership exploiting effective
General Gates had underestimated his troops ability to fight until it was too late to back out. The start of the battle involved
Starting in mid-January to mid-February, there was interest in assaulting the Shahikot Valley in the Paktia province of Afghanistan by employing U.S. ground combat forces as part as an operation due to intelligence reports suggesting that enemy forces, which included al Qaeda and the Taliban where in the stages of reoccupying the area to regroup its forces after its sustaining defeats during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. A debate between intelligence agencies on whether the enemy troops would be on the valley floor or on the hills. Well before the battle, early intelligence estimates, which drew on HUMINT and other sources, claimed that nearly 1,000 al Qaeda and Taliban forces might be present in the Shahikot Valley but then were lowered to about 200 to 300 personnel (Baranick, Binnendijk , Kuglar, 2009). They also concluded that they were mostly living in the valley’s villages, rather than deployed in the surrounding mountains and ridgelines as they thought they would be from the more tactical
They were especially effective at detecting and destroying Mukhabarat and Fedayeen agents within Northern Iraq. (Tucker & Faddis 2009, pg. 88) This came into play when the NILE team was constructing a HUMINT network where Iraqi Army officers were becoming dissidents and defecting to the North to assist in the preparation for the Invasion. The Mukhabarat had word that the NILE was located in Kurdistan and had intentions of assassinating these men or even attempt to capture them and bring them to Saddam, per his orders. (Tucker & Faddis 2009, pg. 72) What the Mukhabarat had not planned on, was the exceptional ability of the NILE team and Peshmerga to detect their intentions as well as ability to detect them.
General Petraeus and his Leadership Approach to Mosul A Leaders Restoration of a Nation Following the invasion of Coalition Forces into Iraq in March of 2003 the Army’s 101st Airborne Division, commanded by Major General David Petraeus, found itself in the Northern Iraqi city of Mosul (Lundberg, 2008). With the invasion complete and capturing of the capitol city of Baghdad accomplished, Major General Petraeus and staff began confronting the issues and concerns of what lay ahead for the duration of the unit’s deployment (Lundberg, 2008). The development and implementation of Major General David Petraeus’ strategy to bring stability to Mosul, Iraq and surrounding areas following the 2003 invasion provides insight into his leadership approach
forces were much more prepared to occupy Iraq when compared to French experiences in Egypt. When conducting a military invasion of a foreign country with a hot, desert climate, bringing necessary equipment is a must to ensure the vitality of infantry troops. However, early in the French invasion of Egypt it became clear that “Bonaparte had neglected to research the exigencies of fighting a war in such a place as the Nile Valley at such a time of the year, and appears not to have realized that water canteens were an absolute necessity. His troops had none”. Obviously, a late 18th century military force would enjoy far less equipment benefits than the United States in the 2000s, but failing to even bring adequate water supplies was a massive blunder.
Scribbles on Scrap: A Mission Command Analysis of the Battle of the Little Bighorn The massacre at the Little Bighorn in 1876 was one of the most recognizable battles in American history. The defeat of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and the slaughter of 268 Soldiers by the Sioux serves as an enduring subject of study for contemporary military professionals. The basic modus operandi for command principles in the times of the Indian Wars loosely mirrors the mission command philosophy of today; however, if we still lay credence to the efficacy of the mission command philosophy, how was it that a conventional force under the direction of a battle proven leader was defeated by an irregular enemy? In the end, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer’s complacent
Upon receipt of his mission, he immediately began to plan, prepare, and execute defensive operations and issued an order for his forces to build a fortified position on Breed's Hill. Prescott knew that his mission was to hold the position until relieved by friendly forces. He also understood the important mission his unit was given and the vital geographical position the hill had on Boston. Planning and preparation accomplish nothing if the command does not execute effectively. Perhaps the most important aspect of mission analysis is determining the combat potential of one’s own
Therefore, the Sunni-Shia conflict in the religion of Islam has been the major cause of the people reacting towards one another with violence, hatred and discrimination, and has caused political leaders to exaggerate the differences of others. Firstly, the Sunni-Shia conflict has caused the people of the two opposing groups to react with violence towards one another as a result of the constant fight for political power. The article titled “The Origins of the Sunni-Shia Split,” states, “Eventually, Ali was chosen as the fourth caliph, but not before violent conflict broke out. Two of the earliest caliphs were murdered.
Anderson, I really liked the way you explained the operational environment and how it pertains to the hybrid threat. I thought your description of the hyprid threat in an operational environment was very accurate. I agree that the enemy has a way of changing their tactics and procedures very rapidly. I think we have to be able to change as an Army very quickly and become more adaptable to meet new threats. I was interested to learn about slat armour and how it can stop RPGs.
Joint Planning for Operation Anaconda SFC Spurlock, Matthew MLC Class 005-18 Joint Planning for Operation Anaconda Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, there have been numerous battles. One of the most important battles that shaped future joint planning of operations was Operation Anaconda. The outcome of this operation was ultimately successful, however, the original intent from the commanders were not met due to errors in the joint planning process. Joint planning during Operation Anaconda proved ineffective because of inaccurate intelligence about the terrain and weather, the exemption of Air Force and Navy during the initial planning phase, and false assumptions about the enemy. Intelligence Intelligence Preparation
The Shi’ite and Sunni factions are two groups of the Muslim civilization that split ways after a disagreement about who Muhammad’s successor should be after his passing. Their greatest differences all relate to their beliefs of authority in religion. The Sunni faction believes that Abu Bakr, a companion of Muhammad, gained the role of leadership in the Muslim religion. The Shi’ite, however, believe that Ali is the rightful new leader to be followed due to family lineage. This disagreement has caused severe tension between the two groups that continues to last in todays society.
When I raised my hand, and took my oath of service I had no idea of the journey Leadership Philosophy that laid ahead of me. Joining late in life was one transition, but the transition into the Non-Commission Officer (NCO) Corps, and a leader has been a very rewarding experience. The values that were instilled in me as a child and those that have been drilled into my make-up as an NCO are very similar. The tenants of the seven Army Values have been what I have lived by most of my life and career, however there are four out of the seven values that I hold most valuable and live out on a day to day basis.
The Oppression of Religion in Iraq The news coming out of Iraq is devastating. The violent extremist group known as Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) continues to take over major parts of Iraq, brutally killing and oppressing any and all who come in their way. The Yazidis are predominantly ethnically Kurdish, an ancient community that have been in Iraq for centuries. Historically the Yazidis follow Zoroastrianism and other ancient Mesopotamian religions.
Therefore and in this atmosphere of relative freedom; two problems appeared: first, between Sunni and Shi’at sects within united Iraq from one hand. Second, between Kurds and Arabs in general from the other hand, with an implied calls for gradual separation and independence of Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Thus, we can not realize the exact identity of Iraq state due to many different calls for one Iraqi identity for all Iraqis along with preservation of all minorities’ features and characteristics. In this paper we focus on Kurdish national trends more than the others, by reason of that the Kurds have more effects on the Iraqi identity from the side of language and culture. Therefore, and to support this idea; we have examined 200 students (20-25 years old) of University of Dohuk, from colleges of Law and Arts (departments of Arabic Language, Kurdish Language, and History) through questionnaire operation by distributing a questionnaire forms to be fulfilled by them.