There does exist a “Western Way of War” characterised by innovations and technological advancement, training and discipline as well as restraint and values of Western countries that have enabled them to exert hegemony over their non-Western adversaries through the centuries. However, at its most fundamental level, it is the West’s ability to project its power over long distances and sustain their forces once they arrive that has allowed the West to bring all the other Western Way of War characteristics to the enemy. Without a mastery of logistics, honed over 2,000 years of experience, the West could not have become the most powerful, preeminent military and cultural force in the world today. From the Punic Wars to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the …show more content…
Ridgway, a general during World War II once observed, "What throws you in combat is rarely the fact that "your tactical scheme was wrong but that you failed to think through the hard cold facts of logistics." Logistics is the key element in western warfare, more so in the 21th century than ever before. The Wests’ success on the modern battlefield has been dictated by how well a commander has managed available logistical support. The United States success in major wars and several minor wars or conflicts in the 20th century are linked more directly to the ability to mobilize and bring to bear economic and industrial power than any level of strategic or tactical design. Operations during the Gulf War to liberate Iraq illustrate this point. Long before the Allied offensive could start, professional logisticians had to gather and transport men and materiel and provide for the sustained flow of supplies and equipment that throughout history has made possible the conduct of war. Commanders and their staffs inventoried their stocks, essayed the kind and quantities of equipment and supplies required for operations in the severe desert climate, and coordinated their movement plans with national and international logistics networks. The first victory in the Persian Gulf War was getting the forces there and making certain they had what they required to fight. It was after these logistic considerations that commanders would initiate offensive …show more content…
Logistics to a large extent has given non-Western forces their most impossible problems. Most of the wars that have not occurred, such as the Egyptian invasion of Libya in the 1970s, have been foiled by difficulties of supply and maintenance. Non-Western armies have a relatively acute shortage of the kind of leaders with managerial expertise to oversee their logistical support. Characteristically, high-quality leaders are siphoned off to man the more prestigious combat arms while the less-gifted or less-politically connected are fobbed off on support functions. Third World armies typically operate in environments where the local infrastructure of roads and railroads are lacking or in poor repair. The ability of the logistician to transport supplies to his troops is thus hampered. Furthermore, Third World armies tend to have more severe maintenance difficulties. This is because they tend to depend on external suppliers for spare parts and inadequate organizational depth to sustain complex supply and maintenance systems. Recent experience of wars between non-Western powers indicates Superpower intervention in logistical support often dictates the outcome of the conflict. Instances include the US resupply of Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Soviet resupply in the Somali-Ethiopian War and the US support to the Mujahidin in Afghanistan. During the
On July 30, 2008, a bloody battle involving Coalition forces took place in the mountainous eastern Afghan province of Nuristan. This was the Battle of Wanat and the devastating amount of Coalition casualties began a vigorous investigation by the United States Army. The village of Wanat, defended by Second Platoon, Chosen Company, Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team would fall victim to numerous bad decision made by higher command. Although the men of Chosen Company fought hard, they ended up surrounded, vastly outnumbered, and without any Battalion assets. This paper will argue the reasons for the disastrous outcome of the Battle of Wanat; examining the effective company leadership exploiting effective
Abrams also stressed a “one war” concept that put equal emphasis on military operations, improvement of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and pacification – all of which are codependent so that the better we do in one, the more our chance of progress in others (18). The changes in tactics under Abrams, and in the concept of the nature of the war, and even the enemy reaction to battlefield reserves, by no means meant an end to fierce combat, or even to large-scale military operations (138). America’s principal national objective became peace. Abrams policy proved to be better than the policy of attrition. The policy of attrition simply meant, under those circumstances, a very prolonged type of warfare, whereas the U.S. can clear and hold, and keep an area secure, and keep the enemy out.
The successful execution of the concepts found in Expeditionary Force 21 (EF21) reside in the ability of the Marine Corps to candidly assess the current state of the operating forces and operational needs while planning to future requirements. Shifting our focus towards the next fight will require, not an overhaul, but the refinement of how the service organizes to fight and operate with joint, and multinational, partners. This is rooted in the understanding that the Marine Corps must adjust its forward deployed posture in order to support the ability to respond across the range of military operations. Deciding where and when to deploy and how to organize in preparation for future challenges, while critical, will solely exist as an intellectual
Realizing the need, Major General Petraeus soon began to employ the division to work local nationals to restart water and electricity and working to reopen schools (Lundberg, 2008). Lacking any guidance from his leadership, Petraeus took many prudent risks in order to further see these plans through by utilizing his own assets. For example, according to Lundberg, he utilized assets such as Army engineers to begin clearing rubble and debris from cities, villages, and roadways. Conclusion Providing a strong leadership approach and willingness to take risk, Major General Petraeus was put on a mission to develop and implement strategy to establish stability in Mosul, Iraq.
Book Review 2: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises by Richard Betts Summary: Betts starts off his book by recognizing the ambiguity around the advocacy of the use of force in a crisis by military leaders even though there is a prevalent assumption that military professionals are more aggressive than diplomats and politicians. He states he writes the book in order to provide a comprehensive survey of the postwar role of American military men in decisions on their most essential function, their use of force in combat. Betts acknowledges the vast availability of literature on military participation in decisions on defense budgets and weapons procurement, but feels there is a void when looking at decision-making from the perspective of military leadership versus civilian leadership.
Can an antiquated lens provide an adequate examination and understanding of modern warfare? The theories of Carl von Clausewitz retain remarkable contemporary merit and relevance in explaining the critical elements affecting warfare in the modern era. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories of war endeavor to be comprehendible, comprehensive, and strategic. Clausewitz contends that the conduct of war itself is without doubt very difficult. But the difficulty is not that erudition and great genius are necessary to understand the basic principles of warfare.1 Clausewitz 's 1812 essay, the Principles of War, offers military commanders, with little campaign experience, a comprehendible, comprehensive, and strategic model for attaining victory in battle.
Unmaking War, Remaking Men by Kathleen Barry Submitted by: ARPIT SAGAR (OT Code-B51) Kathleen Barry is a feminist activist and a sociologist. Her first book launched an international movement against human trafficking. In this book namely Unmaking War Remaking Men; she has examined the experiences of the soldiers during their training and combat as well as that of their victims using the concept of empathy. She explains how the lives of these men are made expendable for combat.
Chris Hedges, a former war correspondent, has a memory overflowing with the horrors of many battlefields and the helplessness of those trapped within them. He applies this memory to write War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, where he tutors us in the misery of war. To accomplish this goal, Hedges uses impactful imagery, appeals to other dissidents of war and classic writers, and powerful exemplification. Throughout his book, Hedges batters the readers with painful and grotesque, often first-hand, imagery from wars around the globe. He begins the book with his experience in Sarajevo, 1995.
That is for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Therefore, in cases where our combat forces are used, they must be committed with enough numbers, equipment, support and resolution to accomplish the object of winning the conflict. President Washington’s urgings had honest intentions, but he could never envision our modern world with its global trade network and convoluted politics. The historic use of American military force has been unevenly applied. Without doubt, a policy of American isolationism is not a possibility.
By definition, “mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations,” according to ADRP 5-0. Mission command is about knowing when to change the task to fit the purpose. This paper is intended to analyze the mission command of one side of the battle, focusing on the commander’s role in the operations process. The Battle of Bunker Hill was the most important battle of the American Revolution because of Colonel Prescott’s superior command and control.
SUBJECT: Information Paper 1. Purpose. To summarize the important parts of the Army White Paper, The Profession of Arms, dated 08DEC10, for the Battalion Commander of 1-22 Combined Arms Battalion (CAB). 2. Facts.
The US military plays a major role in the defense system of the world. Their role can be in the form of military aid, deployment of the military and deployment of the Coast Guards and the protection of people’s lives and freedom. The US is well known for providing military aid to many different countries. The aim of military aid is usually to help allies or poor countries to fight terrorism, counter-insurgencies or to help fight drug wars.
These aspects of equipment and record keeping also affect the functional planning of the U.S. Army. Using a wartime scenario, a Commanding Officer needs to know precisely the amount of equipment on hand, including weapons and ammunition, in order to properly plan an operation. Proper planning, in this sense, ensures that the operation is conducted sufficiently and no lives are
Battle Analysis Methodology: The Battle of Imphal SSG Rolando Tucker SLC School Many different wars in many different parts of the world have affected the categorization and organization of our country today. Not only have these wars had lasting impacts and severe impulses on our country, they each have their own unique individual way they have lead to developments and improvements of our United States Military Forces.