Introduction The Allies declared Operation Husky a victory after 38 days of fighting. The strategic objectives to weaken Italian forces and push German forces back from their front in Sicily were accomplished. Under the Husky victory façade, however, there were continual failures in Allied command and control (C2) and the integration of joint functions. When Operation Husky was executed, unified C2 and integration of joint functions were aspirational concepts that were not fully implemented in operational planning or strategies.
This consequently contributed to incomplete integration of our joint functions at the operational level. By evaluating command and control along with the partially successful integration of fires as well as movement and maneuver, it is clear why the Allies only attained mediocre results. Operation Husky ultimately provided an outstanding learning opportunity which underscored the
THE BATTLE OF FORT RIVIERE The history of the United States can be described through many lenses. One such lens focuses on military actions and decisions, and how those decisions played into the ever-changing history of America. There are many well documented and popularized American wars and battles, which is why this mission command analysis will focus on a battle during the relatively unknown American occupation of Haiti. The battle of Fort Riviere occurred on the 17th of November, 1915 in mountainous northern Haiti between U.S. Marines and Haitian rebels known as cacos.1 Throughout the course of this paper, we will review the social and political aspects leading up to the battle as well as significant outcomes.
Even though his success was not enduring, General Petraeus’ actions in Mosul exemplified describing his intent to subordinate commanders which resulted in unique success during the transition from warfighting to nation building. Just as painting a picture often starts with an image in the artist mind, General Petraeus’ vision originated as an image that only he could see. It takes time for an artist to create a work of art. The artist must chose his canvas, brushes, colors, and choose the technique. The end result of the artist’s work is a masterpiece that inspires all who see it. General Petraeus’ made similar choices when painting for his vision of Mosul for his subordinate commanders. The difference being, his picture was painted using words, influence, and trust. This could also be considered a form of art. When done correctly, the describe portion of mission command is just that, but involves inspiring others to understand
The first confusion halted the initial bombing of key targets and points. Special Operations Forces were too close to enemy targets and called the bombings off (Lyle, 2009). Aircraft were not available at the beginning to assist Task Force Dagger to get to “The Finger” due to only one aircraft in the area helping the Army Soldiers in the valley. MG Hagenbeck did not have the same priorities for AC-130 assets as the Black Special Operations Force units (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003). These Black Special Operations Force units were under the command of MG Dell Dailey.
He provides numerous examples of MacArthur controverting Truman’s guidance, and an administration failing to provide an effective bridge between Truman and MacArthur. He illuminates the significant impact that domestic partisan activities within his administration had on his abilities to form and direct a unified foreign policy and military strategy. He demonstrates Truman’s deference to military authority and his weak executive leadership while he also struggled to balance the need to support his political party with his efforts to lead the U.S. on the world stage. He feared negative domestic perception of any conflict he had with a widely popular MacArthur, especially among his rival political party. Every decision he made was weighed against these political
On July 30, 2008, a bloody battle involving Coalition forces took place in the mountainous eastern Afghan province of Nuristan. This was the Battle of Wanat and the devastating amount of Coalition casualties began a vigorous investigation by the United States Army. The village of Wanat, defended by Second Platoon, Chosen Company, Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team would fall victim to numerous bad decision made by higher command. Although the men of Chosen Company fought hard, they ended up surrounded, vastly outnumbered, and without any Battalion assets. This paper will argue the reasons for the disastrous outcome of the Battle of Wanat; examining the effective company leadership exploiting effective
Joint Campaign: “Operation CHROMITE” Introduction One of the most successful multinational operations was Operation Chromite. The Battle of Inchon was an amphibious invasion that resulted in a decisive victory and strategic reversal in favor of the United Nations (UN) and battle of the Korean War. “North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, caught the United States unprepared” (Korean War, 2006) , the United Nations forces were trapped in the Southeast corner of the Korean Peninsula in an area known as the Pusan Perimeter. With the bulk of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) engaged around Pusan, United Nations Supreme Commander General Douglas MacArthur began advocating for a daring amphibious strike on the peninsula's West Coast at Inchon. The General believed that this would catch the North Korean’s off guard, while landing UN troops close to the capital at Seoul and placing them in a position to cut the North Korean's supply lines.
10 September 1941, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, Senior British Military Commander, was prepared to present a scheme that could potentially end the war in 1941 to General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Ike), General of the Army and commander of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). Following Operation Neptune (D-Day), FM Montgomery was eager to strike the retreating Nazi’s before they had the opportunity to reorganize and secure a strong front line. FM Montgomery’s plan defied Gen Ike’s large scale plan of a broad attack on German Front lines, encircling them and pushing them back to their Capital. The plan was to “Drop 3 Airborne Divisions, plus and independent parachute brigade, anywhere from 15-60 miles behind enemy lines in Holland. The para troopers would secure Key bridges along the main highway from Eindhoven to Arnhem, over the Rhine into Germany.
The history of joint warfare goes back to World War I (1914 – 1918) and World War II (1939 – 1945) where air, land and naval collaborative operations took place. In more recent times, joint warfare was evident in Operation Desert Storm (1990 – 1991) and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this essay, we will take a look at how the nature of warfare has revolutionized through joint warfare. Militaries should move away from tri/quad services and form a main ‘joint’ service due to the change in nature of warfare, the importance of ‘jointness’ and the evolution of technology (thesis).
It is important for commander of each level to be able to precisely describe visualization of accomplishments and end state to be achieved during combat actions. It is especially efficient to Joint Force Commanders to define clear purpose of phases, understanding of facts and risks to be taken to consideration and later on to find the ways how to avoid or mitigate the risks. These all is commander’s consideration so called commander’s intent. Commander’s intent is part of operational order and is included in execution section. Commander’s intent can be released verbally or in written format. Mostly in the joint level commander’s intent is disseminated in written format and therefore it should be clear enough to provide easily understandable
It integrated inputs from Predator, RC-135, U-2, E-8, and other sensors around the clock. Leadership at higher levels often overshadowed the command and control capabilities of on-scene leadership. “Reduced to basics, the sensor-to-shooter cycle entailed finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, deciding, engaging, and assessing the results. Unlike Desert Storm, in OEF each of these functions required steadily less time, with the singular exception of deciding. That function grew substantially because of the nature of the war itself and of the target-approval process modern C4/ISR enabled.
In January 1944 General Dwight Eisenhower was made the commander of Operation Overlord, in the months and weeks before D-Day the Allies carried out a massive deception operation intended to make the Germans think the main invasion target was Pas-de-Calais rather than Normandy. This plan had multiple steps that had to occur chronologically to ensure an Allied victory. Each one of the steps involved in the invasions had different codenames. “The first phase, the amphibious invasion and establishment of a secure foothold, was named Operation Neptune. Second, to gain air superiority, the Allies needed to ensure a successful invasion, the third was where the Allies undertook a bombing campaign known as Operation Pointblank, which targeted German aircraft production, fuel supplies and airfields.
Their militaries often have a divergent view of what constitutes military special operations and the purpose and role of SOF. While military special operations may share some attributes with others, it is a part of the strategic culture and therefore uniquely formed by the viewpoints of the military and the use of power (Yarger, 2013). In the 1970s special operations were defined as: “Secondary or supporting operations which may be adjunct to various other operations and for which no one service is assigned primary responsibility (Barnett, Tovar & Schultz, 1984, p.47) This definition left “special operations” applicable to any service or