Paradox Of The American Presidency By Meena Bose

Thomas E. Cronin, Michael A. Genovese, and Meena Bose structured the fourth chapter of Paradoxes of the American Presidency, titled “Presidential Power and Leadership,” around three central ideas. First, the authors examine American views on presidential leadership and powers, as well as how those views contribute to cycles in American politics. Second, they discuss and critique both the president’s political power, as well as the powers invested in the office by the Constitution. Lastly, the authors delve into the components making up presidential leadership, which they follow with an analysis of the implications this style of leadership has for America’s democracy. The authors highlight how American sentiments toward liberty present

These cycles compete to hinder executive leadership as presidents are most popular when they first come to power, but more competent, knowledgeable, and effective the further they get into their term. The long-term pendulum swing of American politics between conservatism and isolationism also limits the types of decisions presidents can make and receive public support on. The situations of American foreign affairs also present challenges, according to the authors. Times of crisis generally give presidents greater leverage in decision making, but in the aftermath of said crises, the public affords presidents far less latitude. This means that presidents are frequently limited by situations outside of their control that hamper their abilities to do their

Regarding constitutional powers, the authors asserted that executive power capability actually fluctuate with the above-mentioned crisis cycle. That argue that in parallel to the public supporting strong presidential leadership during foreign policy crises, the office of the President is also afforded greater constitutional powers during those times. Cronin, Genovese, and Bose argue that on domestic issues in normal circumstances, presidential power is too limited because of the separation of powers between the three branches of government, but in “crisis or war, presidents often seize or are delegated significant, even imperial powers… the checks and balances of the separation of powers recede, and the president has at least the chance to wield greater power.” In these situations, the authors argue the President has too much power, leading to the presidency’s ‘Goldilocks