Boko Haram And Islam In Nigeria

Despite how strongly the fabric of the social order appears at first glance, its true nature is fragile. Various statuses and categorizations of society constantly clash with one another and bring up competing interests. Religion has served as one of these conflicting statuses for a good portion of the common era and continues to be a major divisive force in politics and society more broadly. Various religions undertake various goals, and, often, such goals interfere with the goals of another religion. At face value, one might presume these differences to be as simple as “Jew versus Muslim” or “Christian versus Muslim;” the reality, though, is that such issues are deeply engrained within the sociopolitical sphere. As a result, religion has

Islam versus Judaism). It can also be more broadly applied to encompass diverging schools of thought within an individual religion. The case of Boko Haram and Islam within Nigeria can attest to this opinion. In many ways, the “religion” of most peaceful Nigerians differs from that of Boko Haram’s fundamentalism. First, examining the history of Nigeria better explains the context of the growth of Boko Haram. Although there have been a number of Muslim presidents in Nigeria, there has also been a sense that Muslims are second class citizens with less access to money and education. The discovery of oil in the South has made many people prosperous but not in the North. Northern politicians have become rich, but their people have. Walker, of course, places a heavy emphasis on the political context within Nigeria to explain Boko Haram’s origins. Wisdom, however, deviates from Walker’s standpoint in forming his response. For Wisdom, he concedes that religious ideology does place an active role in fueling Boko Haram (though it is not the only one he mentions). Wisdom writes that the majority of Boko Haram’s victims are Muslims, not Christians. Given that most of the victims are Muslim, there is a clear disconnect of Islamic interpretation between those victims and Boko Haram’s militant strategy. Thus, in this way, the

Namely, the state of Senegal seemingly provides an objection to this premise. Senegalese culture has been largely welcoming and tolerant of other groups, and political leader have embraced Islam as a form of moderation, using it to establish rule of law. The first president was a Westernized Catholic who spoke French and was married to a white Frenchwoman. Thurston writes that the “marabouts,” or the religious leaders in Senegal were less fundamental than those in Saudi Arabia. They also have had a more positive relationship with the state. Stefan, however, paints a different picture, as though it were an accident in Senegalese history. The Catholic president embraced his faith but also emphasized Muslim relationships, whose own leaders responded in a supportive way. Most of the Muslim leaders told their followers to vote for the Christian even when Sangor was challenged in an election by a Muslim. Despite this convincing evidence, it is important to note that Senegal is one outlier in what seems to be a trend of pluralism threatening the social order. Moreover, to conclude that pluralism has been a “resource” for Senegal is a stretch; the religious diversity does not seem to have strengthened the country in many ways aside from outrightly preventing religious warfare. Thurston maintains that the “concrete social, economic, and political factors have made co-existence of Islam