Political Cleavages

2.3. The Configuration of Political Cleavage
The configuration of political cleavages in Indonesia can be divided into some groups. Ambardi (2008: 35-80) attempts to classify the cleavages into three categories: the religious-secular, the national-regional and the class cleavages. The first two pairs of cleavages had created during the colonial era while the latter denotes to the tension between the capitalist and working classes formed during the New Order regime when the massive industrialisation occurred. This study will concern to the first kind of cleavage, between religious and secular groups. Historically speaking, the configuration of religious-secular cleavages can be traced back into the early of twentieth century when numerous nationalist

Some of them were disqualified by the Indonesia’s Ministry of Law and others were intentionally not registered themselves to the Ministry of Law. This evidence demonstrates that, in fact, there are some parties so-called as “banner parties” due to their fearfulness to show to the public. The rest parties registered themselves to KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, Election Committee) to participate in the 1999 election. As the result, KPU eventually decided merely forty-eight political parties which can be allowed to participate in the 1999 election. In the following elections, there were twenty-four political parties in the 2004, thirty-four political parties and four local parties only in Aceh in the 2009, and twelve political parties and three local parties merely in Aceh in the 2014. During these four cycles of election, political parties were came on gone, because their fate is determined primarily by the required electoral or parliamentary

More than a half century of swift socioeconomic development, social milieux and political parties have been transformed. Although political parties are still marked by aliran, according to Ufen (2008: 5-41), the politics of aliran has lost a lot of its significance by weakening of aliran (dealiranisasi) or dealignment of political parties indicated by seven features. First is the rise of presidential or presidentialised parties with weakened political machines, the stimulation of populism and the surging impact of mass media and modern campaign techniques. Second is the growing of authoritarianism and personalism within parties with powerful ‘advisers’ and executives which punish unruly members, marginalise internal opposition and increase factionalisation. Third is the prevalence of ‘money politics’ with bought candidacies, businessmen taking over party chairmanships and billionaire financiers determining policies behind the scenes. Fourth is the lack of meaningful political platforms. Fifth are weak loyalties towards parties with only ‘emotional’ linkages between voters and parties. Sixth is cartel-like cooperation of parties as indicated by rainbow coalitions, an unorganised opposition and the collusion in tolerating corruption. Seventh is the upsurge of new local elites stimulated by the decentralisation and invigorated by the local