Rene Descartes Dualism Essay

Rene Descartes calls everything into question that he has ever believed in his Meditations On First Philosophy, from doubting anything in existence to pondering what “I” truly means. In his quest to understand the concept of the individual in Meditation Six, Descartes brings up the notion of mind-body dualism. This essay will begin by elaborating on Descartes’ dualism theory and follow up by offering a refutation to Descartes’ claims by denying Descartes’ assertion that the mind and body can persist to form the concept of “I” as we generally understand ourselves. Descartes’ support for the conceivability argument centers on three premises. Descartes’ first premise relies on his belief that his ability to clearly and distinctly understand one thing as separate from another allows him to conclude that they are indeed different from one another. An example of this would be me being able to identify and separate myself from a chair. If I can surely distinguish myself from the

However, in response to my objection, I imagine Descartes’ rejoinder would be in relation to his dreaming argument. He essentially offers the idea that we could be in a “matrix” in which the physical world and our bodily experiences are being simulated through a machine in which we are attached to. For example, he would argue we could believe we are perhaps outside, pedaling a bike down the road, but in actuality the motions of us doing so could really just be simulated by a machine which we are attached to while lying motionless. In refutation to this possible claim Descartes may attempt to make, I ask how could a soul, considering it is an abstract, amorphous form, be attached to such a machine; if I were to be physically attached to such a machine, then I would require a bodily form, which make the point I must have both a ‘thinking thing’ and ‘extended thing’ to exist, not one or the