Analysis Of Sexuality Market-Inalienable By Margaret Jane Radin

Question: is sexuality market-inalienable: an alternative ground

I. Introduction

The ‘market-inalienability’ theory is proposed by Margaret Jane Radin. She proposes that something integral to personhood (including sexuality) should be ‘market-inalienable’. The implication is that the separation of sexuality, which is integral to personhood, will degrade and harm a person. This theory has been considered a well-constructed objection to prostitution. However, this notion is subject to challenges. In this essay, it is argued that although sexuality should be market-inalienable i.e. commodification of sexuality is wrong, the basis of this theory raised by Radin is not convincing: the fact that sexuality is integral to personhood itself does

It then follows that it is wrong to commodify sexuality. While the first one is legitimate, doubt can be cast on the second one: is commodification as such necessarily degrading?

III. Commodifying integral part of personhood necessarily degrading?

It is arguable whether once an attribute is an integral part of personhood, its commodification will certainly be degrading. Consider the case of a professor or a musician. A professor gives lecture and write academic essays, and is paid for them. A musician produces music, and his music is sold in the market. Both of them seem to ‘commodify their capacities’: they make use of their wisdom, knowledge and artistic talents to earn money. If Radin’s basis is true, one’s wisdom or artistic capacity are integral to personhood. Therefore, they should remain ‘market-inalienable’. And to commodify these capacities is morally

And the ‘commodification’ in these two cases does not seem to harm the dignity of the two categories of people. Although they receive payments, the ‘integral parts of personhood’ they commodify are not lost or damaged. These capacities are ‘shared’ and ‘amplified’ by commodification.

This demonstrates that commodifying something integral to personhood may not be degrading in itself. The mere fact that sexuality is integral to personhood does not render it market-inalienable. Instead of the ‘integral part of personhood’ proposition, this essay argues against commodifying sexuality on the basis that it causes gross impairment to prostitutes’ subjectivity. The impairment is so gross that it makes prostitutes subordinate to the clients, degrading their personhood. Such impairment is then unjustifiable.

IV. What is wrong with commodifying sex: equal